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These four analyses look at Syrian foreign policy, and particularly the 
ups and downs in Syria’s relationship with the US since Bashar al-Asad 
and George W. Bush nearly simultaneously came to power. One of the 
most striking and puzzling aspects of this relation is why a Syrian leader 
keen to improve relations with the West was soon the object of a 
concerted attempt to demonize and isolate him. Arguably this had more 
to do with the American politics than with Syria and had Kerry won the 
2000 US election US-Syrian relations would almost certainly have taken 
a much different tangent and the history of the Middle East would have 
turned out very differently.  
 The focus of the analyses is however on what makes Syria tick 
and how this explains its strategies in dealing with the hostile, 
aggressive and powerful US under Bush. The analysis by Hinnebusch 
looks particularly at the continuities from the Hafiz period, showing how 
Syria was in the late nineties on course for a peace settlement with Israel 
under US auspices. The failure of the peace negotiations set entrain a 
series of moves and countermoves that contributed to a crisis in Syrian-
US relations, with Iraq and Lebanon the foci of their clashing agendas. 
The article finishes with a look at the fresh start between the two states 
at the beginning of the Obama administration. Marwan Kabalan focuses 
on the link between Syrian domestic and foreign policy: foreign policy 
is used as much to protect regime survival at home as it is to ward off 
strategic threats from external enemies. Conversely, Syria’s external 
environment affects the prospects of reform at home; one obvious 
casualty of the threats mounted by Washington to the Syrian regime was 
its cautious early political relaxation. David Lesch focuses particularly 
on how the new president Bashar al-Asad sees the world and how he 
managed to survive the hostility of the world hegemon, learning by his 
mistakes, while consolidating his position at home. He stresses the 
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extent to which Syria’s role, whether problem-maker or problem-solver, 
depends in great part on whether the US learns to respects its vital 
interests. Finally, Bassma Kodami looks at how Bashar has apparently 
outlasted the campaign to isolate Syria and looks at Bashar’s choices 
and likely strategies in his new apparently less threatening environment.  
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Syria under Bashar: Between 
Economic Reform and Nationalist 
Realpolitik  
Raymond Hinnebusch 
On Bashar al-Asad’s accession to the presidency in June 2000, Syria 
was at a crossroads. Its new leader’s priority was economic reform, 
which dictated a Westward foreign policy alignment and depended on a 
benign international environment. Only six months later, and fatefully 
for Bashar, George W. Bush was elected President of the US, bringing 
to power elements determined to impose US hegemony in the Middle 
East and deeply hostile to Arab nationalism and to Syria. Given the 
unmatched power and ambition of the US hegemon, which was soon to 
be on Syria’s Iraqi doorstep, and the dependence of Bashar’s reform 
program on integration into Western markets, Syria had powerful 
security and economic reasons to bandwagon with the US, as all the 
other Arab states did. Instead, however, it balanced against US power. 
That it did not bandwagon is ultimately attributable to its distinctive 
Arab nationalist identity and the accompanying regional role that had 
been institutionalized in the Ba’thist state, especially under Hafiz al-
Asad. That this made the difference is evident from the quite different 
response of Jordan’s King Abdallah who faced similar pressures, but, 
having constructed a “Jordan first” identity, chose to bandwagon with 
Washington.1 Hafiz had not only left a role to his son, but also a 
tradition of realpolitik that came out of years of experience coping with 
Syria’s many more powerful enemies; it was this tradition that arguably 
allowed Bashar to survive: when Bush left office in the US he was still 
president of Syria.  
 It was not immediately evident when Bashar came to power that 
the international atmosphere for Syrian reform would sour so rapidly. 
Indeed, Bashar initially receive a positive welcome from most foreign 
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governments and quickly moved to improve Syria’s relations with most 
of its neighbours, notably Iraq and Turkey, while launching a strategic 
opening to Europe. What would not have been predicted in 2000 is the 
way he was soon demonized in various Western circles. A series of 
external events, notably the breakdown of the peace process, the Iraq 
war, which Syria opposed, and the assassination of Lebanese ex-Prime 
minister Rafiq al-Hariri, for which it was blamed, all contributed to 
precipitating a period of unrelenting US hostility. Under extreme 
pressure, Syria’s Arab nationalist identity was aroused, the regime’s old 
Machiavellian foreign policy instincts revived and the domestic reform 
agenda was constrained. In spite of this, Syria continued to seek 
inclusion in the world order, albeit in a way that preserved its identity 
and interests. A revived strategy of power-balancing against threats to its 
vital interests from Israel and the US was paralleled by a continuing 
economic liberalization strategy through which Syria sought to diversify 
its economic dependencies and acquire the economic resources needed 
to sustain the regime. This dual strategy appeared to allow Syria to 
survive the Bush years with limited damage to its interests; the 
inauguration of the Obama administration posed the prospects that US-
Syrian relations might be mended and the environment for domestic 
economic reform much improved.  
Bashar’s Foreign Policy Inheritance 
Certain relatively durable determinants have conditioned the behaviour 
of Syrian leaders and Bashar cannot escape this influence, especially as 
much of it is an inheritance from his father.  
 First, Syria is imbued with a powerful sense of grievance from 
the forced partition of historic Syria (bilad al-sham) by Western 
imperialism and the creation of Israel on the territory of geographic 
southern Syria. Radical Arab nationalism, the dominant identity of the 
country and ideology of the ruling Ba’th party, is a direct consequence 
of this experience. Syria’s Arab nationalist identity, leading it to support 
Palestinian fedayeen operations against Israel, was a key factor in 
provoking the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in which Israel captured Syria’s 
Golan Heights. Since then, all Syrian foreign policy behaviour has 
revolved around the recovery of the Golan. This is a matter of national 
honour and regime legitimacy.  
  Equally important for understanding Syria is its pervasive 
sense of insecurity. It is a small state surrounded by several stronger 
powers that, at one time or another, have been a threat. Historically its 
borders have been violated, most recently by both Israel and the US. It 
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faces a great military imbalance, in respect to Israel, and is now 
sandwiched between Israel in the West and the US in the East (Iraq). As 
such, Syria continues to perceive a threat from what it takes to be 
Western imperialism, a view that has been repeatedly reinforced, 
particularly since the rise of the George W. Bush administration (2000-
2008). Syria currently sees the West’s policies as replete with double 
standards. International law is selectively enforced; thus, Syria's 
chemical deterrent force has been targeted by the West while Israel's 
nuclear one is accepted. The Iraq war showed how the strong "take the 
law into their own hands." For Syrians, it is a Machiavellian world 
where a state’s interests are respected only if it has the power to defend 
them. Hence, great power-engineered demands, advanced in the name of 
the ‘international community,’ enjoy no normative legitimacy in Syria. 
Indeed, Damascus consistently evades the dictates of great powers and 
those who want something from Syria have to negotiate for it. 
 Given its threatening environment, Syria’s grievances and 
ambitions have had to be tempered by the reality of its vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses. Hafiz al-Asad was the first Syrian leader to 
systematically bridge the gap between Syrian goals and means.2 On the 
one hand, he scaled down and replaced Syria’s formerly revisionist aim 
of liberating Palestine with the more realist goals of recovering the 
Golan and creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. On 
the other hand, steadily expanding Syrian military power resulted in a 
mutual deterrence that relatively stabilized the Syrian-Israeli military 
confrontation.3 Syrian-Israeli rivalry was thereby largely diverted into 
political struggle over the conditions of a peace settlement. In these 
struggles, Syria’s deterrent meant that Asad did not have to bargain from 
weakness and could apply limited military pressure on Israel in southern 
Lebanon (via Hizbullah) at reasonable risk.  
 Second, Hafiz realized, by contrast to his radical predecessors, 
that Syria could not do without alliances and he assiduously diversified 
them, relying for a period on Egypt and Saudi Arabia, later on Iran, 
while balancing close alignment with the USSR, crucial for protection in 
a predatory world, with a readiness to engage with American diplomacy 
over a peace settlement. Additionally, because Syria’s slim economic 
base and feeble tax extraction capability could not sustain its enormous 
military burden, Hafiz used external alliances to access enormous levels 
of external aid and loans by virtue of Syria’s front line status against 
Israel, largely from the USSR and Arab oil producing states, in order to 
fill the resultant permanent resource gap. The national-security state 
Hafiz built greatly enhanced Syria’s military security but ultimately 
helped enervate its weak economic base.  
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 Hafiz was also acutely aware, at least after Syria failed to 
recover the Golan in the October 1973 war, that this aim, as well as an 
acceptable resolution of the Palestine issue, made negotiation of a peace 
settlement with Israel unavoidable. He believed, however, that 
successful negotiations depended on a sufficient balance of power; if it 
was too unfavourable, Syria had to be patient and wait until it shifted, 
while taking advantage of every opportunity to contribute to such a shift. 
Syria, he believed, should never negotiate from weakness and unless it 
had bargaining “cards.” Effective bargaining might require the use of 
asymmetric warfare to give the stronger Israeli opponent an incentive to 
negotiate an acceptable deal; this was best pursued via proxies and not 
from Syria territory (hence Lebanon became the arena of struggle) and 
required a military deterrent so that the enemy did not bring his full 
retaliatory superiority to bear on Syria. Aware, too, that only the US 
could broker a negotiated settlement, Syria constantly sought to 
demonstrate to the US that it could advance US objectives, presumed to 
be regional stability, if its interests were accommodated and if not that it 
could also block US plans—such as separate peace agreements 
excluding Syria. Insofar as the US wants a peace settlement in the 
region, it cannot avoid dealing with Syria, for as Henry Kissinger 
famously said, the Arabs cannot make war without Egypt or make peace 
without Syria.  
 Bashar al-Asad attempted to alter this approach, preferring 
dialogue to confrontation and deploying a conciliatory and more 
reasonable personal discourse. However, rising external threats forced 
him to fall back on his father’s modus operendi.  
Political Economy Determinants 
Just as much a threat to regime survival as external enemies was the 
vulnerability of the Syrian economy. Bashar al-Asad’s reform program 
was a continuation and deepening of economic liberalization begun 
under Hafiz that originated in the exhaustion of import substitute 
industrialization and the statist-populist model from at least the eighties. 
This was exacerbated by the decline of Arab aid from the 1980s, but 
interspersed with recoveries when new resources, mostly rent from 
Syria’s own petroleum exports, were accessed. At the end of the 1990s, 
however, stagnant growth, combined with a burgeoning population 
resulted in unemployment rates reputedly reaching 20%. These 
problems threatened to deepen as revenues from oil exports inexorably 
declined, posing the prospect of a fiscal crisis in the medium term. In the 
short term, the regime had accumulated considerable reserves in foreign 
Between Economic Reform and Nationalist Realpolitik    9 
currency to buffer it against emergencies and ease the stress of transition 
to a market economy. Over the long term, a consensus emerged that, 
given the stagnation of the public sector, economic survival required a 
sustained takeoff of private investment which, in turn, depended on 
Syria’s integration into and conformity with the standards of the global 
market and an accompanying Westcentric foreign policy.  
 There were, however, formidable obstacles to deepening Syria’s 
economic liberalization, including the rent seeking behaviour of the 
emergent new crony capitalists around the regime, the “social contract” 
under which regime legitimacy is contingent on public provision of 
subsidized food and fuel, state jobs and farm support prices, and the 
need of the regime to dispense patronage to keep core elites loyal. 
Moreover, private investment, particularly in long-term productive 
enterprise, was deterred by bureaucratic obstacles, lack of rule of law, 
and the regional insecurity generated by interminable regional conflicts. 
Ironically, just as Bashar launched his reform initiative, regional 
conflicts substantially worsened. More than that, integration into the 
Western market had to be reconciled with Syria’s Arab nationalist 
identity and this was impossible as long as the conflict with Israel and 
Western “imperialism” continued and, indeed, dramatically deepened 
after 2002.  
 The failure of the peace negotiations with Israel in 2000 was the 
first external factor that had important negative consequences for reform 
prospects; at the end of the nineties, in the expectation of imminent 
peace, Hafiz, with Bashar as his chief lieutenant, was preparing or 
initiating major liberalizing and anti-corruption reforms needed to take 
advantage of a hoped-for major influx of (mostly Arab and expatriate) 
investment. However, with the failure of the peace process, Bashar’s 
regime had to look elsewhere for resources and found them in an 
opening to Iraq, hitherto a bitter rival but which was now seeking Syrian 
co-operation in evading UN sanctions by re-opening the closed pipeline 
between the two states. Re-export of Iraqi oil sold to Syria at subsidized 
prices provided a billion dollar yearly windfall to the treasury.  
 When this lifeline was shut down by the US invasion of Iraq, 
accompanied by a major and burdensome influx of Iraqi refugees into 
Syria, the regime actually accelerated its economic liberalization in a 
bid to get a cut of the wealth accruing to the Gulf Arab oil producers 
from the new post-war oil price boom. In spite of a fraught regional and 
international environment, Syria did enjoy an influx of Arab investment 
in the mid-2000s that stabilized the economy and fuelled the crony-
capitalist network supportive of the regime. At the same time, however, 
Syria’s determination to hold onto “cards” needed in the struggle with 
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Israel, manifest in its role in Lebanon and its support of Hizbullah, 
soured political relations not only with the US, but also for a time with 
Europe and Saudi Arabia, key economic partners. Very much in doubt 
also was how far Syria’s integration into the world market was 
compatible with a foreign policy that brought recurrent conflict with the 
US hegemon; American sanctions worked to economically isolate Syria 
and Washington pressured Europe to obstruct Syria’s bid for an 
economic association agreement. As a result, Syria shifted its economic 
relations eastward to Russia, Asia and especially toward China but this 
could not wholly substitute for relations with the West.  
Post-Hafiz Leadership: Bashar’s Reformist Project 
While it is now taken for granted, Bashar’s succession and consolidation 
of power, without jeopardizing Syria's hard-won stability, was not self-
evident to observers in 2000. When Hafiz died, the establishment, 
fearful of instability, settled on Bashar as its choice: as an Asad, he 
reassured the Alawis; would not likely betray his father's heritage (not 
being a Sadat); and he was not seen as a threat to them. Yet he was 
popular, being seen as uncorrupted and a modernizer, with the public, 
especially the younger generation.4 Indeed, Bashar's succession evoked 
great expectations that generational change in leadership would be a 
watershed for Syria. When taking office, he spoke of the need to 
improve and modernize the economy, education and the administration. 
He also raised expectations of political change by emphasizing 
‘democratic thinking’ and ‘the principle of accepting the opinion of the 
other’.5 Hence, he represented both continuity and change. 
Yet, initially lacking a personal power base and inheriting a state 
constructed by his predecessor meant he had to share power with several 
power centres that surrounded the presidency—the party politburo, the 
cabinet, the army high command and the security forces—all initially 
dominated by the old guard of his father’s close colleagues. He also 
inherited an experienced foreign policy team from his father, headed by 
Vice President Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, that 
imparted continuity to foreign policy. However, Bashar did soon 
establish himself as "the prime decision maker" and his reform team 
became the dominant tendency in the regime.6 Through the extensive 
legal powers of his office, he engineered the replacement of the old 
guard as it reached retirement age with appointees beholden to himself. 
This process of power concentration was crowned at the 2005 Ba’th 
party 10th Regional conference by the resignation of Khaddam, the 
senior old guardist, and some half dozen other top Ba’th party officials.  
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 Aware of the flaws in the Syrian economic model and familiar 
with the West, Bashar was a reformer at heart, despite the slow pace of 
actual change. Ba’thist ideology ceased to govern Syria’s economic 
policy but Bashar lacked an elaborate blueprint to substitute for it.7 The 
Chinese model of spreading the private sector and the market while 
retaining a reformed public sector was in principle embraced but it 
provided only the roughest of guides and reform proceeded piecemeal, 
by trial and error, and constrained by the need for a consensus within an 
elite divided over how far and how fast to go.8 Reform had to be 
incremental, initially to avoid arousing enemies before Bashar had built 
up his own reformist faction and thereafter to avoid unleashing social 
instability. 
 Bashar's project can be understood as "modernising 
authoritarianism," making the system work better so that it could survive 
and deliver development.9 The first priority was to renew cadres and 
leadership personnel and he engineered, within three years of 
succession, a renovation of the political elite, with a turnover of 60% in 
top offices, thereby transferring power to a new generation.10 His 
priorities were reflected in those he recruited to ministerial office, most 
of whom were technocrats with advanced Western degrees in economics 
or engineering and favouring integration into the world economy.11 His 
reforms included restricting the interference of the party and security 
forces in economic administration, creating the legal framework for a 
more market oriented economy, the opening of private banks and 
insurance companies, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, and 
internet start up. But he made no direct assault on the new class of 
“crony capitalists,”—the rent-seeking alliances of Alawi political 
brokers (now led by his own mother’s family, the Makhloufs) and the 
regime-supportive Sunni bourgeoisie--whose corrupt stranglehold on the 
economy deterred productive investment; he hoped, instead, to use 
international economic agreements, notably the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, to force an opening of the economy that would require them 
to become competitive capitalists; in this respect the EU’s use of the 
partnership agreement as a tool of pressure on Syria retarded the reform 
Europe ostensibly wanted.  
Syrian Foreign Policy under Bashar 
Syria’s policy could have been transformed under Bashar and its 
position in world politics might have turned out quite different than it 
has. In the late 1990s, peace negotiations conducted under US auspices 
offered the prospect of a settlement with Israel. Bashar, bringing the 
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outlook of a new generation, was in some ways predisposed to approach 
Syria’s challenges differently. His political socialization took place in a 
radically different environment from that of his father and the regime 
“old guard.” While the latter were socialized in the era of Arab 
nationalism, war with Israel, and non-alignment, their sons came of age 
in an era in which state-centric identities were fragmenting the Arabs, 
American hegemony and economic globalization had replaced the Cold 
War, and a peace agreement with Israel seemed attainable. While his 
father had remained hunkered down in Damascus and had little direct 
experience of the outside world, Bashar had acquired education in the 
liberal environment of the UK, married a British citizen of Syrian 
descent and, as president, travelled widely in Europe. Evidence of 
Bashar's modernizing worldview was his persuasion of his father to start 
opening Syria to the Internet on the grounds that a closed society was 
handicapped in the competitive world of globalization. It is worth 
cautioning, however, that Bashar’s exposure to the West does not 
compare with that of most other Middle Eastern leaders. Moreover, the 
father-son relation, a presumably powerful socialization mechanism, 
would have committed him to the preservation of his father's Arab 
nationalist legacy while the apprenticeship he served under his father, 
including time within the military, would have socialized him into the 
code of operation of the establishment. And the legitimacy of the 
Bashar’s presidency was contingent on faithfulness to the standard of 
national honour defended by his father, namely the full recovery of the 
Golan from Israel without being seen to abandon the demand for 
Palestinian national rights.  
On the other hand, Bashar faced a deteriorating strategic situation. 
With its old Soviet patron gone and its newer American interlocutor 
turning hostile, Syria could no longer manoeuvre between rival global 
superpowers and lacked a great power protector. Bashar had 
immediately to deal with the consequences of the 2000 failure of the 
Syrian-Israeli peace process and inherited a Turkish-Israeli alliance that 
potentially put Damascus in a pincer. A burst of opposition to Syria’s 
position in Lebanon followed Israel’s withdrawal from the south in 
2000. At the same time, the fragmentation of the Arab world made it 
harder to mobilize Pan-Arab political support or financing for Syria’s 
policies.  
Worse, Syria’s military position was deteriorating. After the 1990s 
collapse of its Soviet arms supplier, it faced the degradation of its 
deterrent. The army’s combat strength deteriorated dramatically during 
the 1990s, its Soviet equipment increasingly obsolescent, with 
Soviet/Russian demand for payment in hard currency and threatened US 
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sanctions against Russian companies that sold Syria arms denying it 
enough ammunition and spare parts. These constraints on Syria’s 
prospects of sustaining the conventional military balance with Israel, 
plus a growing technological and airpower gap with it, led its defence 
effort to take non-conventional directions. Hizbullah’s capacity to fire 
rockets deep into Israel and to engage Israeli forces in asymmetric 
warfare became the first line of Syria’s new deterrent. Syria’s 1990 Gulf 
war aid windfall was invested in a second line deterrent of chemically 
weaponized missiles in hardened sites targeting all of Israel. Perversely, 
it was unilateral Syrian renunciation of this deterrent, crucial to 
maintaining the Syrian-Israeli peace, that the EU, at US urging, tried to 
make a condition of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement with 
Syria.  
 Bashar’s first response to this situation was to try to construct 
multiple alliances, at both the regional and the international levels, 
through which the pressures on Syria might be diluted and external 
resources accessed. He sought to improve relations within the region and 
particularly with Turkey and at the global level he sought a strategic 
opening to Europe and Syrian adhesion to the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, with all the more urgency as friction rose with the US. But 
the 2000 failure of the Syrian-Israeli peace process also triggered Syria’s 
2001 opening to Iraq under Saddam which would bring Syria, via a 
chain of events, into a conflict with the West that substantially diverted 
Bashar’s foreign policy from his initial Westcentric path. Instead Syria 
ended up a partner with Iran in an axis of resistance locked in a struggle 
for the Middle East with the US and its regional allies. Bashar could not 
have anticipated this outcome when in 2000 US Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright attended the funeral of his father and welcomed his 
accession as a reforming president.  
Between Militancy and Conciliation toward Israel  
Bashar pursued an ambiguous policy toward Israel, reflective of his dual 
nationalist and modernizing impulses. Peace negotiations had broken off 
in early 2000 but on assuming power, he affirmed that Syria was willing 
to resume them if Israel acknowledged what Syria took to be the 
commitment made under Yitzhak Rabin to a full withdrawal to the June 
4, 1967 borders on the Golan. But thereafter, the rise of Ariel Sharon to 
power in Israel pushed a settlement off the agenda and his repression of 
the Palestinian intifada inflamed Syrian public opinion against Israel. 
Bashar therefore revived Syrian militancy toward Israel, both to 
generate personal nationalist legitimacy essential to his power 
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consolidation and to send the message to Israel that it could not enjoy a 
peaceful environment and still keep the occupied territories.  
 Syria returned to its earlier insistence that a Syrian-Israeli 
settlement had to be part of a comprehensive one that included a 
Palestinian state (briefly set aside after the Palestinians took 
responsibility, at Oslo, for their own destiny), called on the Arabs to 
support the Palestinian intifada, allowed Hamas and Islamic Jihad to 
maintain offices on Syrian territory even though these groups were 
involved in suicide bombings in Israel and supported Hizbullah 
operations against Israeli forces in the disputed southern Lebanon 
Shebaa Farms enclave. Israel, seeking to make this strategy too costly, 
twice bombed Syrian positions in Lebanon and in 2003 attacked what it 
said was a Palestinian training camp near Damascus after an Islamic 
Jihad suicide attack. As Syrian-Israeli relations deteriorated, anti-Syrian 
enmity grew in Washington, particularly evident in George W. Bush’s 
support for these Israeli attacks on Syria. Syria facilitated the rocket 
armament of Hizbullah as a deterrent against the increased Israeli 
threat12 and made massive arms deliveries to it during its summer 2006 
conflict with Israel.  
 But Bashar still wanted a negotiated settlement with Israel and, 
also in part to disarm the US neo-cons after the US occupation of Iraq, 
he again offered to resume peace talks with Israel. The neo-cons, 
believing a peace settlement to be a benefit of which Syria was 
undeserving, discouraged Israel from responding, but Israel’s failure to 
crush Hizbullah in its 2006 war (and to pacify the Gaza Strip), may have 
incentivized it to explore his offer and in 2008 Turkey began brokering 
informal discussions between the two sides; since an agreement would 
require keen US engagement, however, it would have to await departure 
of the Bush administration.  
Defying the hegemon over Iraq  
In 2000, when Hafiz al-Asad died, US-Syrian relations were still 
amicable; within a few years of Bashar’s succession they had 
degenerated into an enmity that is not easy to explain given Bashar’s 
Westcentric reform agenda. This was also at odds with the long 
recognition of the two sides that they needed each other: Syria saw the 
US, although Israel’s main backer, as a necessary broker in a peace 
settlement and the US under Clinton had seen an Israeli-Syrian peace as 
pivotal to completing a "circle of peace" around Israel and empowering 
‘moderate’ forces in the region. However, Syria was publicly blamed for 
refusing an Israeli offer regarding the Golan at Geneva in 2000, 
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although in fact, as US participants such as Martin Indyk and Robert 
Malley later admitted, Israel retreated from its prior promise of full 
withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Nevertheless, the failure of the peace 
process interrupted the US-Syrian engagement that had paralleled it.13 
And with a settlement off the agenda, Syria ceased to be pivotal to US 
Middle East policy.  
 Most decisive in the decline of US-Syrian relations, however, 
was the rise to power in the Bush government of the Likud-linked "neo-
cons" who had been advocating Israeli use of force against Syria, and 
once in power wanted to similarly use American power.14 In Congress 
US politicians linked to the Israeli lobby began preparing economic 
sanctions against Syria, under the so-called Syria Accountability and 
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA), which the executive 
initially opposed but later accepted. For the neo-cons, Syria was a threat 
to Israel rather than a partner in the peace process and a Syrian-Israeli 
peace in which Israel would have to concede the Golan was a positive 
evil. As US-Syrian disagreements increased, so did the influence of the 
neo-cons overshadow that of US moderates who wanted to retain 
amicable relations with Syria. Thus, after 9/11 Bush announced that all 
states not with the US in the war on terror were foes, but Syria tried to 
take a middle ground supporting the US war on al-Qaida with valuable 
intelligence assistance, but objecting to the bombing of Afghanistan. 
Syria also objected to Washington’s designation of what it regarded as 
national liberation movements--Palestinian militants and Hizbullah--as 
terrorists; it also regarded these groups as "cards" in the struggle with 
Israel and evaded US demands that it cease its support for them. The 
neo-cons made concerted efforts to paint Syria as a threat under the new 
doctrine that any state that both supported "terrorism" and had WMDs 
was a direct threat to the US and liable to suffer a US “preventive war.” 
Neo-con John Bolton regularly raised the issue of Syria’s chemically 
armed missiles, even though this was a purely defensive deterrent that 
enhanced the regional power balance and accused Syria of seeking 
nuclear weapons, although the CIA dismissed his claims. The US later 
supported a 2008 Israeli strike on what it claimed was a North Korean 
built nuclear facility. Its disinterest in Syria's proposal to turn the Middle 
East into a WMD free zone exposed its double standards: this would 
have put Israel’s nuclear capability on the table while Washington’s aim 
was to force a unilateral disarmament of Syria.  
 Iraq was, however, the main issue that led to worsening Syrian-
US relations. Bashar’s 2001 opening to Iraq coincided with the Bush 
administration’s attempt to prevent Iraq from inching out of the isolation 
the US had tried to maintain since 1990. It objected to Syria’s receipt of 
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Iraqi oil outside the UN oil-for-food regime even though US allies 
Turkey and Jordan received similar privileges. US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell mistakenly believed that he had obtained Bashar's 
agreement to put the proceeds from Iraqi oil in UN escrow accounts and 
when this did not happen Powell professed to find Bashar 
untrustworthy.15  
 The immediate catalyst of the crisis in US-Syrian relations was, 
however, the US determination to invade Iraq. At the UN and in the 
Arab League, Syrian diplomacy attempted to build a coalition to block 
or at least withhold legitimation from an invasion. Yet Syria, keen not to 
be isolated from "international legitimacy" voted for UNSC 1441, 
mandating the renewal of United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq, in 
the hope this might deprive Bush of an excuse for war; indeed US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote a letter assuring Syria that the 
resolution aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Iraq WMD standoff. 
Bashar infuriated Washington when, in a famous interview on the eve of 
the war with al-Safir (on March 27, 2003), he observed: "No doubt the 
U.S. is a super-power capable of conquering a relatively small country, 
but...the U.S. and Britain are incapable of controlling all of Iraq."  
 Syria did little to actually oppose the US invasion. Security 
barons close to Bashar allegedly facilitated pre-invasion sales of arms to 
Iraq, which, although meant for Iraqi self-defence, were considered 
illegitimate in Washington. Riding the tide of anti-American fury that 
swept Syria and expecting that Iraq would hold out for months, the 
regime allowed the movement across the Iraqi border of thousands of 
Arab resistance fighters, many from northern Syria with its close ties to 
Iraq and concentration of Muslim militants. Once the Saddam regime 
fell, Syria also gave refuge to some Iraqi officials fleeing Iraq.  
 Bashar al-Asad's defiance of Washington over the war, in 
striking contrast to the appeasement of other Arab leaders, was no 
idiosyncratic choice but it did reflect Syria’s Arab nationalist identity 
rather than a pure calculus of interest. There were many incentives for 
Syria to acquiesce in the invasion. Opposing it gave the neo-cons in the 
Bush administration the opportunity to depict Syria as a US foe. Hafiz 
al-Asad had been rewarded for siding with the US in the first US-Iraq 
war of 1990 with control of Lebanon, which Bashar lost for opposing 
the US in 2003. Had circumstances been similar Bashar probably also 
have bandwagoned with the US, but in 2003 they were entirely 
different: If in 1990 Hafiz had a US commitment to a vigorous pursuit of 
the peace process, in 2003 the neo-cons made sure no such offer was on 
the table. If in 1991, Iraq was the aggressor against another Arab state, 
in this instance an Arab state was the victim of aggression by an 
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imperialist power. Indeed, Syrian public opinion was so inflamed 
against the invasion that regime legitimacy dictated opposition, a more 
important consideration for Bashar’s unconsolidated rule than was the 
case for Hafiz in 1990.  
 But the risks were high. In the wake of its triumph over Saddam 
Hussein, Syria was in Washington's crosshairs as the last remaining 
voice of Arab nationalism. The neo-cons were keen for the US to make 
an object lesson of Syria to convey the message that Arab nationalism 
was very costly and clear the way for a pro-Israeli Pax Americana in the 
region. The US presented Syria with a list of non-negotiable demands 
that threatened its vital interests: to end support for Palestinian militants, 
dismantle Hizbullah, withdraw from Lebanon, and co-operate with the 
occupation of Iraq—in short, to give up its “cards” in the struggle over 
the Golan, its sphere of influence in the Levant, and its Arab nationalist 
stature in the Arab world. No Syrian government could accept such 
demands without a major quid pro quo.  
 The regime believed, in fact, that it could steer a middle way 
over Iraq between unrealistic defiance of US power and surrender to it. 
The US, Syrian strategists believed, could not as readily resort to 
military force against Syria as it did against Iraq: Syria was not subject 
to international sanctions, and the destruction of the regime would likely 
further spread the chaos and radicalism unleashed in Iraq. While the US 
could easily defeat the Syrian army, the real military costs would come 
from pacifying a conquered Syria where the US would be harder pressed 
than in Iraq to find collaborators and would have no comparable oil 
resources to fund its occupation.  
 Nevertheless, under US threat, Syria rapidly backed away from 
overt support for the resistance in Iraq. Syria also continually sought an 
accommodation with the US, using what it thought were bargaining 
"cards": depending on whether Washington respected its interests, it 
could either advance or obstruct US interests, given its status as a key to 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; its unique ability to restrain or 
unleash Hizbullah’s proven ability to hurt Israel; the offer of intelligence 
co-operation against al-Qaida and its ability to contribute to the 
stabilization or de-stabilization of Iraq. But it was imperial overreach 
that ultimately gave Syria a certain space for manoeuvre between 
defiance and submission. The hegemon had expended a lot of soft power 
over Iraq and its military was so over-committed that it could not take 
on another war and occupation.  
 Still, under unrelenting pressure, Syria did make further 
incremental, but ultimately significant concessions to appease 
Washington: borders with Iraq were tightened, Hizbullah was 
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encouraged to stop its campaign against Israeli forces in the Shebaa 
farms, and in 2005 Syrian forces were withdrawn from Lebanon. 
Believing that much of US animosity to Syria was propelled by the neo-
con's Likud connection, Bashar tried to disarm them by proposing to 
restart the peace negotiations with Israel. However, since Bush’s policy 
was not to offer inducements to "rogue states,” these concessions only 
encouraged US hardliners to demand more. Washington succeeded in 
depriving Syria of some of the vital "cards" by which it exercised 
political leverage in regional politics and especially towards Israel, most 
notably its dominant role in Lebanon. Equally important the Bush 
administration's devaluation of the traditional goals of US Middle East 
policy, regional stability (for which the neo-cons substituted “creative 
destruction”) and the peace process, correspondingly devalued the 
"cards" by which Syria could promise to deliver or obstruct these goals. 
The 2006 Baker Commission’s recommendation that the US engage 
with Syria and Iran, an acknowledgement of imperial overreach, raised 
hopes in Damascus that were dashed by Bush’s rejection of this advice. 
Hanging on in Lebanon  
Syria’s role in Lebanon was another issue fraught with contention 
between it and the West, as well as pro-Western states such as Saudi 
Arabia. They viewed Syria’s tenacity in defending its influence in 
Lebanon as obstructive and negative. As Damascus sees it, however, it 
has permanent interests in Lebanon. One relates to identity: Lebanon is 
seen as a detached part of Greater Syria, hence Syria’s natural sphere of 
influence and also a country that must be brought to acknowledge its 
Arab identity and not become a Western outpost like Israel. Lebanon has 
also been a source of economic resources for regime patronage 
networks. Syria has vital security interests in Lebanon: it must not be 
allowed to become a base for forces threatening to the Syrian regime. 
This includes Syrian opposition elements that have sometimes made 
Lebanon a safe haven. It also includes keeping Israeli influence out of 
the country, and specifically the reconstruction of the Israeli-Maronite 
alliance of the eighties; the Israeli military threat to use Lebanon’s 
Bekaa valley to attack Syria’s Western flank must also be deterred, a 
main justification for Syria’s troop presence there. Moreover, the 
Hizbullah-Syria alliance had become strategic for Damascus, with each 
supporting the other against common enemies. Hizbullah’s ability to 
stand up to Israel is a pivotal part of the Israeli-Syrian power balance. 
Bashar developed close personal relations with and was said to admire 
Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the enormous Arab nationalist 
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prestige Hizbullah won in standing up to Israel also benefited its Syrian 
patron. Finally, Lebanon was one of Syria’s strategic “cards“ in any 
peace negotiations: Syria could both veto a separate Lebanese peace 
with Israel and help deliver Lebanon into an acceptable one; it could 
also keep a hand on the ‘Palestinian card’ through Lebanon or 
Hizbullah. 
 From the point of view of Damascus, the US and France set out 
to deprive it of its “cards” and sphere of influence in Lebanon. It was 
their attempt to undermine Syria’s role in Lebanon, seen as a potential 
weak spot, that may have precipitated the assassination of former 
Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, which was then blamed on 
Syria and used to mobilize demands for its expulsion from the country. 
The idea that Lebanon after Syrian occupation would be neutral and 
independent was not seen as credible in Damascus: either it would be 
the sphere of influence of Syria or succumb to that of the US-French-
Saudi axis or even be penetrated again by Israel—their Lebanese clients 
would dominate instead of Syria’s. Lebanon also now came to be seen 
as the main instrument through which they could threaten the Syrian 
regime. The unprecedented use of international institutions against Syria 
has been very alarming for Damascus. UNSC Resolution 1559 calling 
on Syria to withdraw from the country and for Hizbullah to disarm was 
pushed by the US and France despite the reluctance of other Security 
Council members and despite the protest of the Lebanese government 
against this interference in its sovereign affairs and that it was a bilateral 
matter with no implications for international peace and security, 
normally needed to justify UN intervention. The unprecedented setting 
up of an international tribunal to investigate the Hariri assassination was 
seen in Syria as a tool of regime change. Lebanon was also seen as a 
battleground in a wider struggle for dominance in the Middle East 
between the US and the forces of nationalist resistance, led at the state 
level by Iran and Syria, with parallel struggles in Iraq and Palestine 
expected to be affected by the outcome in Lebanon. Although Syria 
understood there was no prospect, after its forced 2005 withdrawal, of 
wholly restoring its old role as arbiter of Lebanon, it was determined to 
blunt the advance of its enemies there.  
 Syria’s strategy in this struggle for Lebanon included several 
prongs. The alliance with Iran was tightened. Keeping the Hizbullah 
card was seen as essential to making sure Lebanon would not become a 
platform for regime change in Syria. Hizbullah’s ability to stand up to 
Israel in the 2006 war showed its special value in any peace negotiations 
and as a deterrent against Israel. The key to protecting Hizbullah was to 
restore the ‘consociational’ system in Lebanon wherein no key decisions 
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could be made without a consensus of the major sects—thus 
institutionalizing a veto for Hizbullah. This was against the attempt of 
the Western-backed March 14th coalition to use their majority in 
parliament and government to push through policies inimical to Syria 
and Hizbullah. 
 This strategy carried considerable costs. Europe was alienated, 
over the Hariri affair in particular and, at US urging, suspended the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement Bashar had sought. 
“Moderate” Arab regimes, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt were 
antagonized. However, the strategy seemed to pay off when Hizbullah’s 
May 2008 power demonstration in taking over West Beirut broke the 
Lebanese deadlock and led to the Doha agreement on formation of a 
national unity government in which Hizbullah had a veto over policy 
and the election of a neutral (if not pro-Syrian, pro-Hizbullah) President, 
Michel Suleiman. Syria would not now likely be undermined from what 
Washington had considered its main point of vulnerability, Lebanon; 
however the Lebanese elections of June 2009, won by the anti-Syrian 
March 14 coalition, threatened to again disrupt governance by a national 
unity coalition and split Lebanon, in part over the role of Syria.  
The domestic political consequences of the Iraq war 
Bashar initially had hoped to expand political liberalization, at least to 
the extent that it could be made to support rather than undermine regime 
legitimacy, economic reform and his own power position. His 
authoritarian reformist faction was flanked by two other political 
tendencies which he had to master. Old guardists sought to preserve the 
role and privileges of the Ba'th party, the nationalist line and perhaps the 
populist contract with the people. The loyal opposition ultimately 
wanted a democratic transformation of the system, but sought to 
gradually advance it through a coalition with Bashar's modernizers. The 
Damascus spring of 2001, in which Bashar encouraged civil society to 
express constructive criticism, seemingly in an effort to foster forces that 
would strengthen his own reformist agenda against the old guard, 
suggested that a modernizer-loyal opposition coalition was possible. But 
when hard-line opposition elements framed the conflict in zero-sum 
terms (attacking the legacy of Hafiz) and put the spotlight on the corrupt 
activities of regime barons, the hard-liners in the regime were 
empowered and Bashar shut down the experiment. Western democracy, 
he asserted, could not just be imported and democratization had to build 
upon social and economic modernization, as in the Chinese model, 
rather than precede it – lest instability, a la Gorbachev, ensue. Indeed, if 
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Bashar’s economic reform program entailed rolling back the social 
contract and entering a stage of crony capitalism, authoritarian rule 
would be needed to contain popular opposition.  
 At the same time, as the neo-cons trumpeted the US conquest of 
Iraq as a first step toward inspiring revolt against similar regimes across 
the region, Bashar laid down red-lines for the opposition: threats to 
national unity (by stimulating sectarian conflict) and any collaboration 
with foreign forces were unacceptable. Human rights campaigner 
Haitham al-Maleh and hard-line opposition figurehead Riyad al-Turk 
agreed that US pressures undermined reformers and enabled the regime 
to justify continued emergency powers.16 The loyal opposition asked to 
be included in a national unity government to strengthen Syria against 
the external threat and there were good reasons for bringing it in: 'To 
stand up to the Americans you have to make internal changes and 
mobilize people around you,' said one analyst. 'If not, you have to follow 
the Americans…The regime...has not decided which way to go.' No 
opposition figure advocated submission to US demands to reduce 
support for Hizbullah or militant Palestinians. Syrians of all ages, sects 
and classes seemed to share a profound dislike of Bush for having 
attacked Iraq, as they believed, on behalf of Israel and to seize its oil. 
Some favourably compared their president's stands to the failure of the 
'cowards who run the Arab countries' to stand up to Bush.17 The Iraq 
war stimulated an Islamic revival and the regime tried to use it to strike 
a détente with Islamic forces that had long represented the main 
alternative to Ba'thist rule.18  
 The legitimacy of the regime must, however, have suffered 
from the foreign policy reverses inflicted by the US, given that this had 
long rested on its claim to act for Syrian Arab nationalism. If Hafiz was 
respected for his effectiveness on behalf of this cause, Bashar had to 
swallow several American and Israeli military provocations and Syria’s 
forced evacuation of Lebanon. The mounting costs of defying the US 
stimulated growth of a 'little Syrian' identity. Yet the very fact that 
Washington targeted the regime for its stands on behalf of still popular 
Arab causes--its support of Palestine, its association with Hizbullah and 
its opposition to the invasion of Iraq--generated a certain solidarity 
between regime and people. Many Syrians, feeling victimized by the 
US-orchestrated global demonization of Syria over its Lebanon 
presence, rallied around the government rather than turning against it. 
Additionally, the chaos and sectarian conflict in Iraq, together with the 
fear--ignited by the Kurdish riots of 2003 and the rise of Islamic 
militancy--that the 'Iraqi disease' could spread to Syria, led the public to 
put a high premium on stability. This generated for the regime what 
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might be called 'legitimacy because of a worse alternative.' However, the 
regime could not be brought to undertake political experiments that 
might constrain its monopoly of power at a time when it had to both 
cope with threat from without and push economic reform within. 
From the “Struggle for the Middle East” to partial emergence  
from isolation 
A major consequence of Syria’s stands on the Iraq (2003) and Lebanon 
(2006) wars was a shift in regional alignments as Syria was estranged 
from its traditional Arab partners, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Bashar was 
highly critical of their acquiescence in the US invasion of Iraq and they 
blamed Syria and Iran for the 2006 Lebanon war; the Saudis also 
blamed Syria for the assassination of their long time ally, Rafiq al-
Hariri. Syria accused the Saudis of backing terrorist attacks in Syria “to 
ruin Syria’s image as island of stability that the West should deal with.” 
By 2006 Syria had became involved in a struggle for the Middle East 
between what some saw as two axes, a “moderate” one aligned with the 
US, backed by the EU and including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan 
and, on the other side, Iran and Syria, aligned with Hizbullah and 
Hamas, which stood for Arab nationalist and Islamic resistance to the 
US in the region and enjoyed wide support in Arab public opinion. Iraq, 
Lebanon and Palestine were the key battlegrounds between the rival 
alliances. As Syria faced isolation in the West as a “pariah” state, its 
links with Iran and the radical axis were strengthened.  
 Yet by the end of 2008, Syria seemed to have survived the 
Western campaign against it and relations seemed to improve. Even 
before that the manifest disaster brought on the US by the neo-cons’ 
policies had led to the decline of their influence in Washington and a 
corresponding decline in US enmity toward Syria. Bashar outlasted his 
two main nemesises, Bush and Chirac, with both of their successors 
apparently abandoning their efforts to isolate the country. But the 
change of heart in the West toward Syria also resulted from a realization 
that the policy of isolating it was counterproductive. The 2008 shift in 
the power balance toward Syria in Lebanon precipitated a shift at the 
international level in which French President Sarkozy broke with the US 
policy of isolating Syria, the symbol of which was his invitation of 
Bashar to the Paris launch of his new European-Mediterranean union 
where Syria’s accession to the European-Mediterranean partnership was 
again put on the agenda. On the other hand, relations with Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia were subsequently exacerbated by Syria’s backing for 
Hamas in the 2008 war over Gaza and their ambivalent stance on the 
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Israeli invasion, although there were some signs thereafter that Riyadh 
and Damascus were trying to end their feud. 
 By 2009, Syria had managed to position itself between two 
networks: on the one hand, it was part of the Iran-led “resistance axis,” a 
defiance of the West enabled by diversified economic connections to 
Asia and renewed security and economic relations with Russia (taking 
advantage of Georgian crisis); on the other hand, the Westcentric option 
had been revived: Western Europe, manifest in detente with France; in 
Turkish-sponsored peace talks with Israel; and in a cautious dialogue 
with the new Obama administration. If its interests were ignored or 
respected Syria could tilt one way or the other.  
 Yet, Syria still laboured under serious vulnerabilities. To 
advance economic reform and overcome the looming resource/ fiscal 
crisis, it accelerated its integration into the global economy through a 
kind of “Lebanonization” in which inward investment in tertiary and 
luxury businesses was prioritized. This, however, made the country 
more vulnerable to global economic pressure and turmoil in financial 
markets. Moreover, the departed Bush administration had engineered an 
institutionalization of Syria’s “pariah-hood” that would be very hard to 
reverse. It has thus strewn several “mines” in the path of Syria’s 
attempted integration into the global economy. US sanctions on the 
economy and particularly the Syrian commercial bank obstructed 
aspects of the regime’s attempted global financial integration, 
discouraged companies from doing business in Syria and made more 
difficult and expensive the acquisition of key components needed for 
flagship sectors of the economy such as banking, oil, and 
telecommunications. The international Hariri tribunal constitutes a 
permanent threat that can be used to extract concessions from Syria by 
its enemies. The IAEA charges over an alleged nuclear site destroyed by 
the Israelis near Deir ez-Zor may likewise be used against Syria (while, 
typically, Israel’s air attack on a sovereign country was ignored by the 
“international community.”) Were these threats to the regime to be 
actively deployed, it would undoubtedly do whatever is needed to 
survive. In this respect, the “Qaddafi option”—surrendering its “cards”--
would only be possible in the unlikely event Israel was prepared to 
return the Golan. Its most likely response would therefore be to tilt away 
from the West and back to the resistance axis, again seeking to outlast 
its antagonists.  
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Syrian-US Relations under Obama 
Before Bush, US-Syrian relations were amicable; will Bush’s departure 
make much difference in repairing the serious rupture between the two 
countries? Syria gave the Obama administration a cautious welcome and 
Obama moved fairly quickly to explore the possibility of improving 
relations. Bashar told the Guardian (February 17, 2009): "We have the 
impression that this administration will be different, and we have seen 
the signals. But we have to wait for the reality and the results."  
 Indeed, the US seemed initially to continue the policy of Bush 
in setting conditions and making demands on Syria while expressing 
them in a less pre-emptory and more conciliatory way. In a 15 February 
2009 meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mouallem, US 
Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman reportedly brought up the 
issues of Syria's support of terrorism, its efforts to obtain nuclear 
weapons, its involvement in Lebanon, and the deterioration of the 
human rights situation in Syria (Al-Nahar, February 27, 2009); he said 
afterwards that the U.S. had not yet reached understandings with Syria 
about all of these issues. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, declared at a press conference in Beirut on his 
way to meet Bashar that Syria has to respect Lebanon's independence, 
advance a solution to the inter-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts 
between Hizbullah and the other Lebanese factions, promote the 
implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701 (on Syria-Lebanon relations), 
and change its behaviour towards Iraq (Al-Hayat, February 19, 2009.) In 
his meeting with Kerry, Bashar called on the U.S. to relinquish the 
“policy of dictates” that had proven to be ineffective, stating that 
dialogue was the only way to identify the real problems (Al-Thawra, 
February 22, 2009) After the meeting Kerry stated that despite the 
disagreements, there was a chance for genuine cooperation between the 
two countries on various issues (Al-Watan, February 22, 2009). The 
Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar (March 12, 2009) reported that the US offered 
to play a role in Israeli-Syrian negotiations, remove Syria from the list of 
states sponsoring terror, and lift the sanctions currently imposed on it if 
Syria severed its ties with Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas, and other Palestinian 
factions. The London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that Syria had 
expressed a willingness to help in settling the conflict between Fatah and 
Hamas, in establishing a Palestinian unity government, and in arranging 
the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, March 4, 
2009). However, Asad's political and media advisor Buthaina Sha'ban 
said that improved relations with the U.S. would not be at the expense of 
Syria's relations with Iran, and added, "It is [also] time to stop telling 
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Syria and Iran to sever their relations with Hizbullah, Hamas, and the 
other resistance organizations." (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, March 19, 2009). 
Indeed, Syrian officials argued, "If the U.S. wishes … to sponsor the 
peace process, it must be impeccably impartial and fair. To that end, it 
must declare that resistance is a legitimate right, and that terror and 
resistance are two different things." (Tishreen, February 21, 2009). Al-
Mu'allem likewise called on the U.S. not to link its bilateral relations 
with Syria to the latter's positions on Middle East issues. (Tishreen, 
March 22, 2009).  
 Still, Syrian officials were conciliatory and optimistic. The 
Syrian Ambassador to Washington 'Imad Mustafa remarked: "There is 
much common ground between Syria and the U.S. as to ending the war 
in Iraq, attaining peace [in the Middle East], and restoring the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people. However, there are disagreements about 
the details and about the methods and mechanisms of implementation." 
(Al-Thawra, February 24, 2009). In an interview for Al-Jazira, Foreign 
Minister al-Mu'allem said that there were "some points of convergence" 
between the Syrian and U.S. positions regarding the security, stability, 
and unity of Iraq, and that Syria supported Obama's decision to 
withdraw from this country (Teshreen). He also expressed willingness to 
support the implementation of Resolution 1701 regarding Lebanon, and 
disclosed that, in accordance with it, Syria was forming a special team to 
demarcate the Syrian-Lebanon border (Al-Akhbar, March 12, 2009). 
 According to a senior Syrian analyst, the US and Syria agreed 
that terrorism and WMDs were a threat, and that Arab-Israeli peace was 
a shared interest. But they disagreed about the source of terrorism: for 
Syria, Israeli state terrorism was the threat while, as Syria saw it, the US 
deliberately obfuscated the distinction between terrorism and resistance 
to Israel by Hizbullah and Hamas. For Syria, the Israeli nuclear arsenal 
was the threat while the US was fixated on claims that Iran and Syria 
were trying to acquire WMDs. While Syria believed peace required 
pressure on Israel, the US wanted to get concessions from the Arab side. 
 For its part, Syria also had conditions for putting relations on a 
fully amicable footing. As a first step, it wanted the appointment of a 
U.S. ambassador in Damascus (Al-Thawra, February 25, 2009). It called 
for removal of Syria from the list of countries sponsoring terror, and the 
abolition of the Syria Accountability Act, which imposes US sanctions 
on Syria (Al-Safir, November 28, 2009). In addition, Syria appeared to 
believe its policy toward the US had paid off. As Syria’s US ambassador 
argued: "Syria's winning card is [the fact that] it has not moved from its 
positions despite all the pressures it has been facing… The 
[fundamental] principles of [its] policy towards Washington have never 
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changed, [even] in the most difficult circumstances" and Syria had never 
"submitted to this blackmail" (Al-Watan, February 24, 2009). Moreover, 
former Syrian information minister Mahdi Dahlallah put forward a 
sceptical view of the new administration: "The most important factor 
that brought about the change [in U.S. policy] is the Arab resistance 
camp, [comprising] Syria, the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance, and 
the Iraqi people, who refused [to accept] the occupation. Additional 
[factors] are the Iranian position, which refuses to accept the [American] 
hegemony, as well as the new Russian policy…" Had Bush been able [to 
implement] his policy without meeting opposition from anyone, the new 
administration would have continued the same policy… The change 
introduced by Obama … does not stem from an [American] 
reassessment of its ideology … but from [Bush's] failure to achieve the 
goals that the U.S. was – and still is – pursuing… (Tishreen, February 
25, 2009). [This administration simply] realized that it cannot promote 
the totality of its interests in the region without a relationship with the 
Syrians…”  
 Nor were the Syrians sure that the Obama team would bring 
more than a change in tone. Syrian MP Khaled Al-'Aboud declared: 
"The U.S. insists on playing a role that, so far, has been too big for it. It 
has not yet grasped the facts or [acknowledged] the legitimate and 
unquestionable rights of the people of the region.” For example, the U.S. 
continued to support the anti-Syrian March 14 forces in Lebanon as a 
tool to pressure Syria and sought to construct an Arab coalition to 
pressure Iran (Tishreen, March 10, 2009). One Syrian commentator 
wrote: "The ecstasy displayed by the Arab public as it followed Obama's 
victory is understandable: their hatred for Bush made them feel 
vengeful.“ The likelihood was, however, that Obama’s more astute 
diplomacy and the better image he had secured for the US would merely 
reduce resistance to US power.  
 Indeed, Obama renewed sanctions on Syria for another year on 
the grounds that agreement had not been reached on dealing with 
“terrorism:” Syria was specifically accused of re-opening the routes for 
militants into Iraq. On the other hand, US Middle East envoy, George 
Mitchell visited Damascus as a prelude to starting up the Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations track. In his team was Frederic Hof, an expert on what a 
Syrian-Israel settlement might look like, with a reputation for scrupulous 
even-handedness toward the issue, a big improvement over the 
dominance of the US team under Clinton by friends of Israel such as 
Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk. In late June it was widely reported that 
the US would appoint an ambassador to Damascus although at the time 
of writing this had not happened.  
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 The massive August 2009 bombings in Iraq which its Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed on Syria threatened to put Syria again 
at the eye of the storm. Prior to the bombings, Syrian and US officials 
had held discussions on an apparent common interest in the stabilization 
of Iraq, given the US decision to withdraw from the country. Syria’s 
prime minister and foreign minister had recently visited Iraq and a 
Syrian ambassador was appointed in Baghdad. Maliki had himself just 
visited Damascus for talks on cooperation and although Syria refused 
his demand to hand over Iraqi Ba’thists residing in the country, the visit 
seemed to consolidate relations. However, after the bombings both 
countries withdrew their respective ambassadors amidst a public 
exchange of accusations. Given Syria’s stake in good relations with both 
Iraq and the US, few objective Western analysts or Arab observers 
found the charge against Syria to be credible and most assumed al-
Maliki needed a scapegoat for his regime’s security failures. 
Remarkably, Iraq’s presidency council disassociated itself from al-
Maliki’s charge. The US did not join in the accusations made against 
Syria, but the occasion was seized on by neo-con Eliot Abrams to attack 
the Obama administration for its policy of engagement, a reminder that 
Syria still has many enemies in Washington. 
Conclusion  
Bashar al-Asad’s first term in office could hardly have been more 
turbulent. As his second term entered its second year, his foreign policy 
record looked far better than would have been anticipated a few years 
previously. According to the premier Syria watcher, Patrick Seale, he 
has prevented Lebanon from falling under the influence of a hostile 
power, resisted U.S.-Israeli hegemony by forging a counter-alliance with 
Iran and Hizbullah, and remained steadfast in backing the Palestinians. 
He had refused to compromise the Arab nationalist credentials on which 
the regime’s legitimacy rested, had managed to insulate Syria from the 
chaos on its eastern and western borders and to evade US efforts to 
isolate and damage Syria’s economy.19And the West, headed by a new 
American president, seemed to acknowledge that engagement with Syria 
could not be avoided.  
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Syrian Foreign Policy Between 
Domestic Needs and the External 
Environment  
Marwan J. Kabalan 
Introduction  
For the past eight years, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad has been trying 
to implement his vision of reform while minimizing political and social 
costs. Due to domestic and external constraints, the pace of reform has 
been slow. Syria's domestic politics, it must be recognised, has always 
been tied to its foreign policy, dancing more often to the tune of regional 
and international developments. On the other hand, many have argued 
that Syria's foreign policy is its main domestic export, that is, that its 
foreign policy has been exploited to access resources needed for 
domestic security. What is certain is that the inside and the outside are 
intimately related: Syria's domestic needs have in most cases shaped its 
foreign relations and regional alliances while the external context has 
intimately affected domestic policy. 
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Syria relied heavily on the 
Soviet Union not only for security assurances but also for economic aid. 
As a result, Soviet-style planned economy was introduced and most of 
the big private businesses were nationalised. Improvement in the 
relationship with the conservative Arab regimes and the West in the 
1970s led to the introduction of the first liberal measures in the country 
in two decades. This earned Syria also badly needed handouts to sustain 
its economy and support the ailing public sector. 
 During most of the 1980s, Syria's support of the Iranian 
revolution and in the war with Iraq deprived it of most Arab economic 
aid. Iran compensated for that in the form of cheap crude oil and other 
technical assistance. 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the bad shape of the 
Syrian economy played key roles in defining Syrian foreign as well as 
domestic policies in the post-Cold War era. Syria supported the US-led 
coalition to force Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This position allowed 
Syria to navigate safely in an unfavourable unipolar world and also to 
win generous economic handouts from Arab Gulf States. Syria also 
joined the Madrid peace process; hoping that peace with Israel would 
not only lead to regaining the Golan Height, but would also generate 
good economic opportunities for the country and increase foreign 
investment. 
 The honeymoon with the US and the relaxed regional 
environment led to the second wave of economic liberalisation in Syria. 
The Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi axis and the illusion that a peace deal with 
Israel was in hand led to further liberalisation of the Syrian economy. 
 When President Bashar al-Asad came to power in 2000, the 
regional and international settings seemed ripe enough to introduce far-
reaching economic and political reforms. A year later the whole picture 
changed, however, leading to a shelving of most of the domestic reform 
programs. Foreign policy, Syria's main export since 1970, has not 
always been an asset. At times it became a liability and proved to be 
extremely risky especially when there was a conflict of interests with the 
dominant powers in the international system. Such was the case when 
Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq and President Bush's Greater 
Middle East Plan. 
As Syria established itself as the anti-US power in the region, the 
Bush administration contemplated regime change in Damascus. The 
troubled relationship with Washington and other key powers in the 
region made the Syrian regime feel quite insecure, with the result that it 
put most of the domestic reform measures on hold. One must not, 
however, put all the blame for the slow pace of reform in Syria on 
external factors and harsh regional conditions. There are indeed key 
domestic challenges that also played major role in hindering reforms; 
but, when survival, the bottom line and first priority for Arab states, is 
threatened, every other concern is relegated to the bottom of the agenda. 
The impact of Regional and International Contexts on Reform 
under Bashar 
For most of the 1990s and up until the US invasion of Iraq, Syria's 
relationships with the western powers, chiefly the US and France, could 
be described as cordial. President Jacque Chirac was the only western 
head of state to attend the funeral of the late Syrian president Hafez al-
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Asad in 2000. He pledged to provide all sorts of support to help the new 
Syrian leader –Bashar – to steer a radical reform. The Clinton 
administration sent Secretary of State Madeline Albright to Damascus. 
In a symbolic gesture of approval of the succession process, she held a 
two-hour meeting with the new president. Syrian News Agency (SANA) 
described the meeting as "constructive and successful". Crown prince 
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Mubarak of Egypt, Syria's two 
key regional allies, expressed also their support for the new leader.  
 Taking advantage of the hospitable regional and international 
environment, Bashar launched his reform project. He pledged to 
liberalize Syria’s politics and the economy. The first six months of his 
tenure featured the release of political prisoners, the return of exiled 
dissidents, and open discussion of the country’s problems. The changing 
regional and international contexts played key roles in slowing, at times, 
halting or even rolling-back Syria's reform process.  
 The September 11 attacks on the US brought fundamental 
change to US policy, particularly in the Middle East. Before 9/11, US 
strategy in the Middle East revolved around two key themes: 
maintaining the status quo; and relying on strong leaders to sell any 
peace deal with Israel. After 9/11, however, stability in the Middle East 
was no longer seen in Washington as an asset but a liability. In addition, 
as the peace process disappeared from the Bush administration foreign 
policy agenda, strong Arab leaders were not really needed to deliver 
peace. The "war on terror" became the driving force of the Bush 
administration and "constructive instability" was designed to act as its 
modus operandi in the Middle East. 
 How did this shift in US foreign policy affect its relationship 
with Syria and by extension Asad's reform plans? At the very beginning 
Syria made "let the storm pass" a principle guide of its foreign policy. 
Although it broke with this principle in opposing the invasion of Iraq, 
thereafter it hence tried to deflect the wrath of the Bush administration 
by providing minor concessions and expressing support for its "war on 
terror". Later on, Syria gave away more vital concessions but failed to 
elicit any reaction from Washington. 
 In the wake of 9/11, Syria anxiously watched Lebanon being 
moved from the sideline to occupy a centre-stage in Washington’s 
policy to the Middle East. Hizbullah – on the US State Department list 
of terrorist organisations since 1984 – became a key target in the “war 
on terror”. In the immediate aftermath of September 11 Syria tried - 
through a quid pro quo policy - to eliminate Hizbullah from 
Washington’s target list. Damascus supplied Washington with 
"sensitive" information about Islamic activists; hoping that in return 
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Washington would ease the pressure on Syria and Hizbullah. It did not 
work out. The euphoria resulting from the quick collapse of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan lured the neo-cons in Washington to shift the 
focus to Iraq. 
 Irritated by Syria's opposition to the invasion of Iraq and by its 
continued support for Hamas and Hizbullah, the Bush administration 
gave the go-ahead signal for the Congress to pass the Syria 
Accountability Act. The Act, which imposed economic sanctions on 
Damascus, called for Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, cease 
intervening in Lebanon’s internal affairs and stop supporting Hizbullah. 
Lebanon became a key front in the arm-twisting between Syria and the 
US. Anti-Syria protests by Lebanese activists were, in the opinion of 
many observers, instigated by the US pressure on Syria. They were also 
seen as the beginning of a political struggle to decide on who will rule 
Lebanon in the coming years. Bashar spent most of his time at this stage 
trying to ward off mounting US pressure to "change the behaviour of his 
regime". Reform, as a consequence, was put on hold. 
The Invasion of Iraq and Syria's Security Dilemma 
The invasion of Iraq was the key bone of contention between Syria and 
the US. From the very beginning, Syria was hoping that the US would 
fail to control post-war Iraq and struggled to accommodate itself with 
the strategic change which made the US a key Middle Eastern power. In 
early April 2003, President Bashar al-Asad told the Lebanese newspaper 
al-Safir that he hoped the invasion of Iraq would fail and that "popular 
resistance" would prevent the United States from controlling the 
country. As for the choice Syria would make, then foreign minister 
Farouk al-Shara‘ told the Syrian parliament that his country has chosen 
to stand with “the Iraqi people and international legitimacy”, which the 
US and Britain have discredited by invading Iraq without a UN 
mandate. 
 Syria’s position was seen by many as an irrational defiance to 
US hegemony. Some tried to explain it on ideological grounds; that is to 
say: Syria, by reason of being the hotbed of Arab nationalism, has 
always been paranoid about "Western designs" to keep the Arabs weak 
and divided. This “paranoia” forced Syria to adopt anti-Western policies 
during the Cold War. But Syria’s policy on the Iraqi crisis had nothing 
to do either with the legacy of the Cold War or the bitter experience of 
the colonial era. Syria’s position was simply a response to domestic 
needs – both economic and political - and was envisaged in geopolitical 
terms, which were directly linked to its security dilemma. After all, 
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Syria supported the US-led war against Iraq in 1991 and dispatched 
20,000 troops as part of the war efforts to expel the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait. Syria also participated in the Madrid Middle East peace 
conference and came close to cut a peace deal with the former Israeli 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin.  
 The ascendance of Benjamin Netanyahu to power in Israel put 
an end to Syria’s endeavours to regain the occupied Golan Heights. 
Protracted economic crisis - as Arab financial aid dried up and oil prices 
plummeted in the international market - also contributed to Syria’s own 
vulnerability. As a result, Syria was forced to look for other options to 
survive and -at the time - Iraq was the only one available. 
 Syria had no love for the former Iraqi regime. For more than 
three decades, relations between the two wings of the ruling Ba‘ath 
party in Damascus and Baghdad were shaped by mistrust and animosity. 
In addition, the two regimes had been involved in numerous attempts 
and counter attempts to unseat one another. Syria also supported Iran in 
the eight-year war against Iraq, whereas Iraq backed the Lebanese anti-
Syrian government of General Michel ‘Auon in 1989-1990. One feature 
was, nevertheless, common between the two regimes, that is, the utmost 
pragmatism and flexibility. As a result, from 1997 Syria and Iraq came 
to see one another as possible allies. The late Syrian President Hafez al-
Asad started cautiously, but steadily, developing relations with his 
lifelong enemy, Saddam Hussain. The ascendance of Asad’s son, 
Bashar, to power hastened this process as the new president lacked the 
personal animosity which marked the relation between Saddam and his 
father. 
 Between 2000 and 2002 Syria tried to develop its political and 
economic ties with Iraq but was careful not to provoke the Bush 
administration. The 9/11 attacks provided Syria with a mixed 
opportunity to proceed in a quid pro quo policy with Washington. 
Damascus supported President Bush's "war on terror" and supplied the 
CIA with valuable information on Islamic activists; in return 
Washington turned a blind eye to the smuggling of Iraqi oil through 
Syria. Syria and the US were also at pain to hide their differences over 
the definition each gave to the activities of Hizbullah and Hamas.  
 The rapid fall of the Taliban regime and the shift in US policy 
from fighting terror to invading Iraq led to ending these tacit 
understandings.  
Relations between the two countries reached their nadir over the UN 
Security Council resolution 1441 (urging Iraq to abstain from WMDs), 
which Syria, after long and painful arms-twisting, voted in favour of. 
Syria supported the resolution after being assured by French President, 
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Jacque Chirac, that it did not authorize an automatic use of force against 
Iraq without another UN resolution. Syria also played an important role 
in aborting US attempts to secure another UN resolution that authorised 
the use of force to topple the Iraqi regime. When the US decided to 
abandon the UN process altogether and go after Saddam, a clash of 
interests seemed inevitable. Syria could not but oppose the US-led 
invasion of Iraq and its policy was based on pragmatic grounds. 
 From a political and strategic perspective, Syria was almost 
certain that the war against Iraq was fought by the US on behalf of 
Israel. This was a perception that could not be easily dismissed given 
that the war was planned and advocated by Israel’s friends in 
Washington. In a region that is still very much dominated by a 
realpolitik approach and a delicate balance of power, Syria feared that a 
US-backed military administration or a Karazi-like government in 
Baghdad would almost certainly place it in between two hostile powers: 
Israel and a pro-US Iraq. Syria was also concerned about the possible 
disintegration of Iraq and the likelihood of this affecting its own Kurdish 
minority. In addition, the war was seen in Damascus as an attempt to 
reshape the political map of the region in a way that suited Israel and the 
US. This fear mounted when former Secretary of State Colin Powell, in 
a testimony to the US Senate in February 2003, stated clearly that this 
was a key objective of the US war on Iraq. More important, perhaps, 
Syria feared that it could be next on the US hit list and Washington 
made no effort to calm these fears.  
 Economically, Syria had been benefiting from profitable 
relations with Iraq for several years. From October 2000 until the US 
invasion, Syria was receiving 200,000 barrel of Iraqi oil daily at low 
prices. This amount of oil allowed Syria to increase its share in the oil 
market and generate $2 billion annually of much-needed hard currency. 
The advent of an unfriendly regime in Iraq deprived Syria of this 
important economic privilege at a time it was most needed. 
 From a domestic perspective, the Syrian government could not 
ignore the anti-war sentiments of its own people. Bashar’s regime was 
young and lacked the strength and experience of his father. A pro-US 
stand would have caused his legitimacy unbearable damage and could 
have placed him in a very weak position vis-à-vis the opposition. In 
Syria, Islamists, pan-Arab nationalists as well as remnants of the 
communist parties were all united in their opposition to the US war on 
Iraq. That war, as a result of the messianic tone of the Bush 
administration, was seen by most Syrians as a war against Islam. In 
addition, many Arabs, Syrians included, believed that the invasion of 
Iraq had nothing to do with an alleged Iraqi acquisition of weapons of 
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mass destruction, but an imperial crusade to control Arab oil resources. 
Anti-American sentiments also run high when Syrians, like most Arabs 
and Muslims, held the US responsible for the killing of more than 3000 
Palestinians during the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
 The US invasion of Iraq had a tremendous impact on Syria's 
domestic and foreign policies. Threat perceptions, resulting from US 
policy in the region, shaped Syria's regional agenda and affected its 
reform plans.  
Lebanon and the US-French Understanding 
During the first two years of Bashar's rule, Damascus had a friendly 
relationship with Paris. In 2002, Syria joined forces with France, Russia, 
Germany and China in the UN Security Council to prevent the US and 
Britain from passing a resolution to legalize the use of force against Iraq. 
A year later, however, Syrian-French relations started to deteriorate at 
an incredible pace. Friendship turned into animosity and suspicion 
replaced trust. So, what had instigated this shift? 
 It all started in November 2003 when president Chirac sent his 
political advisor, Maurice Gourdeau-Montagne, to Damascus to meet 
president Bashar al-Asad. At the time tension between Washington and 
Paris could not be cut with a knife thanks to Chirac's strong opposition 
to the Iraq war.Montagne told al-Asad that the Iraq war had changed the 
political map of the Middle East and that Syria thus possibly needed to 
reconsider its anti-war policy. Having realized that what has been done 
in Iraq could not be undone, the French wanted to mend relations with 
the US. Montagne told his Syrian hosts that that was also the position of 
Germany and Russia. Syria disagreed. 
 In June 2004 Chirac took advantage of his meeting with 
President Bush in Paris to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the 
Normandy landings to persuade him to move beyond their 
disagreements over Iraq and toward agreement over Syria and Lebanon. 
Chirac, through his close ties to former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq 
al-Hariri, was the one who initially brought the US into Lebanon. Until 
Hariri's murder, the Bush administration had no independent Lebanon 
policy.In August 2004, Montagne paid a secret visit to Washington to 
follow up on the Normandy talks between Chirac and Bush. He and 
Condoleezza Rice, then national security advisor to President Bush, 
agreed to turn a new page in their relations and to co-ordinate their 
policies in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon. The two countries 
sponsored resolution 1559 in the UN Security Council, calling upon 
Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Syria sensed a shift in the 
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policy of the great powers. The natural Syrian reaction was to 
consolidate its influence in Lebanon. Damascus felt that Lebanon should 
not be lost under any conditions. It hence, supported the extension to the 
tenure of its ally, president Email Lahoud.  
 The shift in French policy did not only affect Lebanon but other 
issues in the Middle East as well, causing further damage to its relations 
with Damascus. France and Israel set aside their animosity for the sake 
of a rapprochement. This was accompanied by a tilt toward US and 
Israeli priorities seeking the isolation and destabilization of the Syrian 
regime. France believed that its interests in the Middle East were no 
longer served by supporting the status quo in Syria. For France, the 
death of Yasser Arafat and the collapse of the Saddam regime marked 
the end of the era of Pan-Arabism. Chirac decided, hence, to embrace a 
different policy line in the Middle East, one that took into account the 
occupation of Iraq, the end of the Intifada, the collapse of the Arab state 
system, and the "lack" of reform in Syria. 
The assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri gave Chirac a strong reason to 
break with the past, abandon Syria, ally himself with the US, and pursue 
a new Middle East policy. That policy led to the exit of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon. 
Insecurity Prevails 
The September 11 attacks on Washington and New York have been the 
single most important event in determining America's outlook toward 
the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. But even before 9/11, 
some in Washington had called for increasing sanctions and pressure on 
Syria, with some advocating forced regime change in Damascus and 
others conditional engagement. While each of these options had its 
proponents among US foreign policy elites, the most radical position 
was held by neo-conservative theorists who back in 1996 had 
recommended “weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria” as a 
new national security policy to the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu. Their vision for the Middle East envisioned creating a new 
political order based on tribal and religious lines in place of the strong 
secular regimes in Iraq and Syria. Under the Bush Administration, 
numerous neo-conservative foreign policy strategists came to hold 
positions of influence, particularly in the National Security Council, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defence, the Office of the Vice President, and 
within the President’s advisory circles. To these hard-line Zionist 
advocates, both Jewish and non-Jewish, 9/11 provided a unique 
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opportunity to fuse Israel’s security preferences in the region with 
America’s "war on terror". 
 President Bush’s early call for the establishment of a Palestinian 
state after 9/11 was rapidly displaced by the interpretive logic of hard-
line Zionism. With international attention focused on the U.S war in 
Afghanistan, Israel moved to devastate the civil infrastructure of the 
Palestinian Authority. The U.S administration did not object, thereby 
permitting Israel’s colonial-zionist interpretation of terrorism to align 
itself with America’s war on Al-Qaeda. This obfuscation established 
that America and Israel were pitted against the same terrorist threat and 
must both fight an existential war against irrational enemies; to negotiate 
with such enemies effectively amounted to rewarding terror. This view 
grew to be a dominant influence in the formulation of U.S Middle East 
policy. America set out on a course to uproot “rogue” regimes, either by 
military force, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or through diplomatic 
isolation and political pressure, as in Iran and Syria. The U.S would not 
offer incentives to such states to induce positive changes; diplomatic 
engagement would be limited to pressure. According to its neo-
conservative initiators, “constructive instability” was to alter the 
regional security environment to the advantage of both America and 
Israel. 
 During its first term, there was no solid evidence to support the 
claim that the Bush administration was seeking regime change in 
Damascus. Yet, the Iraqi file served to stigmatise Ba'athist Syria as a 
prospective target and to urge further sanctions against it. Essentially, 
the Bush administration could not resolve its internal differences over a 
coherent Syria policy, leaving it with an ineffective posture. In fact, the 
White House was able to agree only on a list of complaints about Syria’s 
lack of cooperation, which it reiterated in largely unproductive 
diplomatic exchanges with Damascus. 
 Towards its second term, however, the Bush administration 
began to coordinate a joint policy offensive with France seeking to 
diminish Syrian influence in Lebanon and, ultimately, expel it 
altogether. To this end, Washington’s “Syria Accountability Act” 
decreed economic and financial sanctions, while UN Security Council 
Resolution 1559 required Syrian troops to leave Lebanon and demanded 
the disarmament of all militias, a measure aimed at Hizbullah. 
Following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, 
the U.S withdrew its ambassador from Damascus and intensified its 
policy of isolation by encouraging the heads of state, foreign ministers, 
and presidents of other countries to boycott the Syrian regime. As part of 
the concerted Franco-American effort against Syria, the European Union 
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suspended an initialled agreement with Syria over the “Mediterranean 
Free Trade Agreement”. The policy of forcing Syria out of Lebanon had 
several aims: beyond targeting the Lebanese sources of Syrian income 
and foreclosing the prospective growth of Syria’s economy, the U.S also 
sought to deprive Damascus of its Lebanese base for applying political 
and military pressure against Israel. 
 By that time, Syria had already been established as the key anti-
US power in the region and was hence regarded by the Bush 
administration as a major obstacle towards pro-US change in the Middle 
East. The regime in Damascus was seen also as incurable and that 
something had to be done about it. The story of 1559 might have ended 
when Syria bowed to pressure and ordered the exit of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon, but next-steps were being cooked-up in Washington to finish 
off the other (Syrian) wing of the Ba’ath party. Those who wanted to 
continue the campaign in the name of freedom and democracy started to 
address the question of internal Syrian politics directly. President Bush 
and his policy advisors moved slowly, but steadily, towards adopting the 
following position: it is in US interests to attack Syria, not only for its 
foreign policy--for "occupying" Lebanon, or for troublemaking in the 
region--but because it treats its people in a repressive way and for 
resisting democratic change in the Middle East. US pressure on Syria 
mounted. Damascus was repeatedly accused of sending suicide bombers 
to kill US troops in Iraq, supporting "terrorist groups" in Lebanon and 
Palestine and spoiling US plans for a "New Middle East". As a 
consequence, Syria was enlisted in President Bush's "axis of evil", 
alongside Iran and North Korea. 
 The neo-conservative policy of non-engagement towards Syria 
did not succeed in modifying "problematic" behaviour by Damascus. On 
the contrary, since constructive channels with Washington were not 
available, Damascus cultivated a strategic relationship with Iran, as well 
as bolstered its support for a democratically elected Hamas and for 
Hizbullah. Furthermore, Iraq became a greater source of regional 
instability than before the US invasion, while Iran’s influence in the 
region increased steadily. On the other hand, the Bush administration 
did succeed in facilitating the desired Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon 
and disrupted economic investment in Syria. Indeed, the Lebanon 
portfolio presented a policy theatre of special strategic importance to 
Syria. 
 For that exact reason, US-Syrian relations reached their lowest 
ebb in the July 2006 war when Israel, in co-ordination with Washington, 
sought to undercut both Syria and Iran's regional influence by trying—
and failing-- to break the backbone of Hizbullah. In September 2007, the 
Between Domestic Needs and External Environment    39 
Bush administration renewed its efforts to punish Damascus, hence, the 
Israeli air-strike inside Syria. The mystery about the target of the Israeli 
raid on Syrian territories caused a great deal of concern in Damascus. 
Syrian officials believed that the Israeli raid was nothing but the tip of 
the ice-berg of a grand US-Israeli plan to attack Damascus and 
dismantle the Syrian-Iranian alliance. 
 Shortly afterwards, the Bush administration activated a shelved 
plan to support the Syrian opposition abroad. Washington channelled 
millions of dollars to groups and individuals seeking to overthrow the 
regime of Bashar al-Asad. Alarm bells went off in Damascus when the 
National Salvation Front (NSF), a loose umbrella for Syrian 
oppositionists in exile, held its second congress in Berlin, electing its 
political bureau. 
Syrian-Saudi Relations Turn Sour  
Syrian-Saudi relations had been boiling beneath the surface since the 
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 
February 2005. The Saudi government hinted at a Syrian role in the 
elimination of Hariri and joined forces with France and the US to expel 
the Syrians from Lebanon. The two countries also took different sides in 
the power struggle in the Palestinian territories. Syria supported Hamas 
whereas Saudi Arabia supported president Mahmoud Abbas of the 
Palestinian authority. 
 During the 2006 war in Lebanon, relations between the two 
countries reached an all-time low. While Saudi Arabia (along with 
Egypt and Jordan) criticized Hizbullah's July 12, 2006 raid into Israel as 
"reckless", Syrian President Bashar al-Asad cheered on the Islamist 
group, describing its resistance as "heroic". The differences over 
Hizbullah's raid broke into the open during the Arab league emergency 
meeting in Cairo in mid July. The foreign ministers of the two countries 
traded barbs over whether Hizbullah bore any responsibility for the 
escalation in violence that followed its capture of two Israeli soldiers. 
The Saudi foreign minister was quoted as saying that Hizbullah's actions 
were "unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible". His Syrian 
counterpart, Walid al-Mouallem, lashed back, asking "How can we 
come here to discuss the burning situation in Lebanon while others are 
making statements criticizing the resistance". After the fighting ended, 
President Asad criticized Arab leaders, whom he refrained from 
mentioning by name, for failing to support the struggle against Israel. 
Riyadh took this attack personally and the Saudi-owned media retaliated 
with a barrage of anti-Syrian material. 
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 The tension between the two countries seemed to have eased 
during the Arab summit in Riyadh in March 2007. King Abdullah 
received President Asad, who took part in the summit, and expressed his 
wishes to improve Saudi-Syrian relations. Syrians were also pleased by 
the King's opening remarks in which he criticized the US policy in Iraq 
and described the presence of its troops as "occupation". In the 
following months, an exchange of visits by senior officials from the two 
countries to translate the King's wishes into something real was 
expected. It did not happen. 
 The key reason that hindered rapprochement between the two 
countries was the growing alliance between Damascus and Tehran. 
Saudi Arabia was very disturbed by the Syrian-Iranian alignment and 
Iran's increasing influence in the region. It, hence, boycotted the March 
2008 Damascus Arab summit. The absence of the Saudis annoyed the 
Syrian government, causing further tension. 
 Syrian officials believed that Riyadh may have taken the key 
step towards complete breakdown in the relationship between the two 
countries. Damascus thought that Saudi Arabia had decided to support 
the US efforts to isolate it and force it towards total submission. It also 
complained about Saudi support for anti-Syrian Lebanese politicians as 
well as playing host to Syrian oppositionists. Saudi Arabia, on the other 
hand, accused Syria of not being sensitive enough to its concerns on a 
number of regional issues, particularly its strong ties with Iran, lack of 
co-operation to solve the Lebanese crisis and its Iraq and Palestine 
policy. 
 In fact, Damascus and Riyadh have always been key players in 
what the late Middle East expert Malcolm Kerr called “the Arab Cold 
War”, wherein the two countries have at several key points taken 
opposite sides (Kerr 1971). In the 1950s, Syria rallied around the pro-
Soviet Egyptian regime, whereas Saudi Arabia sought protection from 
the Western camp. Relations between the two countries improved only 
after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, to which Saudi Arabia contributed a 
small brigade on the Syrian front and imposed an oil embargo on 
western nations backing Israel. 
Syria’s honeymoon with Riyadh lasted until the Iranian revolution 
in 1979, which put the two countries once again in opposite camps. 
Syria supported the Khomeini government throughout the eight-year 
war with Iraq, whereas Saudi Arabia stood by Iraq and financed its 
military machine against the Iranians. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
brought the two countries very close to one another. The Saudis watched 
with astonishment as Syria supported the US-led coalition to expel the 
Iraqis from Kuwait. The shift in Syrian policy led to the emergence of 
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the tripartite axis, including Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which 
dominated Arab politics for the following decade. 
 The tripartite axis survived until the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Despite of the fact that Saudi Arabia and Syria both opposed the 
US invasion, their policies diverged widely after the collapse of the 
Saddam Hussain regime. Riyadh accepted the US occupation as a fact; 
Syria rejected it and supported the Iraqi resistance. Their positions 
regarding Iran were however the key bone of contention between the 
two countries, reflecting both geopolitical and ideological 
disagreements. Geopolitically, Saudi Arabia was more concerned about 
Iran's regional ambitions and its quest for nuclear weapons. The fear that 
Iran might use Saudi Arabia's large Shiite community as a Trojan horse 
to destabilize the Saudi royal family was also a matter of great concern. 
Saudi Arabia also complained about Iran's endeavour to establish a 
Shiite-dominated government in Iraq and was seen largely as a key oil-
exporting rival. By contrast, Iran is Syria's major and only ally in the 
region. Given its geopolitical location, Syria does not seem to be 
concerned about Iran's nuclear and regional ambitions. Syria fears Israel 
more than Iran and the alliance with it is seen by Damascus as 
fundamental to its national security and wellbeing. Syria neither seems 
to be bothered by the so-called Shiite crescent or Iranian revolutionary 
expansionism. However, the conflict with Saudi Arabia has inflated 
Syria's security dilemma, affecting both its foreign and domestic 
policies. 
The Fall-out of the July 2006 War 
The six-week conflagration between Israel and Hizbullah during July 
and August 2006 was characterized by the rivalling interests of 
numerous actors. Israel's desire to degrade Hizbullah converged with 
American and European interests in weakening Syrian and Iranian 
strategic power. For Syria, the hostilities served to remind the United 
States and Israel that neither country can solve its security problems in 
the region without a strategic understanding with Damascus. The largest 
military payoffs from the war were accrued by Hizbullah and its 
backers. While the militia’s rocket arsenal unveiled an unprecedented 
first-strike capability, its field tactics and subterranean fortifications 
demonstrated that Hizbullah can damage and deter Israel. The handling 
of the hostilities by Israel’s leadership exhibited a lack of sound 
contingency plans and severely tarnished its image of military 
invincibility. But while the Jewish state spectacularly failed to achieve 
its declared objectives, it did make important strategic and diplomatic 
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gains regarding the pacification of its northern borders. Recognizing that 
a desirable military outcome would not be easily attainable without an 
arms embargo, Israel’s campaign against Hizbullah pursued major non-
declared objectives: creating a pretext for Lebanon’s government to 
support an international mandate aimed at containing Hizbullah and 
facilitating a multinational force explicitly authorized to obstruct 
Hizbullah military activity; hence, UN Security Council Resolution 
1701. 
 Israel’s aims were not wholly achieved, however. As resolution 
1701 lacks a UN-Charter Chapter VII mandate, peacekeeping forces are 
left subordinate to the authority of the Lebanese government. The 
security tasks of UNIFIL and the arms embargo imposed on Hizbullah 
would not be effective without the earnest cooperation of either the 
Lebanese or Syrian governments, each adversely affected by the 
hostilities. The war severely eroded public confidence in Beirut’s ruling 
coalition by unmasking the supposed virtue of its US-backing as a 
mirage and showing Lebanon’s interests to be sacrificed to Washington's 
regional goals. Hizbullah's performance, during and after the war, 
resulted in a major domestic victory and effectively blunted the March 
14 coalition’s enmity towards Syria.  
 Bashar al-Asad gained considerable political capital from the 
war. A host of diplomatic and military dignitaries, European, American 
and Israeli, have come out in favour of negotiations with Syria. To be 
sure, the prospect of 15,000 multinational troops operating south of the 
Litani River would hamper Syria's efforts to facilitate and coordinate 
pressure against Israel from Lebanese territory. Yet, amidst the new 
political fault lines in the region, Hizbullah’s disarmament and the 
implementation of resolution 1701 would come about only as part of a 
broader political agreement in the region. This would require 
abandoning the discredited conceptual foundations of America’s current 
Middle East policy and a more substantive vision for the region which 
included positive engagement with Syria. 
Conclusion 
Like many other countries in the region, Syria struggles with a range of 
problems that need to be addressed sooner rather than later. Some of 
these problems are of existential nature not only for the regime but also 
for Syria as a state and society. Many Syrian would rather blame the 
inhospitable international and regional environment for most of their 
country's key challenges, an argument that cannot be easily dismissed. 
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 Its four-decade old rentier state system has made Syria almost 
completely dependent on foreign aid subject to political conditions. 
Throughout the 1970s, Syria survived on handouts from the oil-rich 
Arab states plus other forms of aid, including military support from the 
Soviet Union. After a short, but severe, economic crisis in the mid 
1980s, the Syrian economy thrived again, achieving a growth rate of 
eight percent per year. This rate was attained partly because Syria itself 
became an oil exporter. Oil revenues enabled the government to inject 
great amount of cash into the crumbling public sector, pay for public 
services and delay economic and subsequently political reforms. 
 In the late 1990s, some economists started to raise the alarm at 
the speedily depleting Syrian oil reserve. By 2012, most experts believe, 
Syria will become a net oil importer. Given that oil income accounts for 
20 percent of the GNP, 70 percent of exports and 50 percent of the 
central government revenues, the decrease in oil production will be 
extremely harmful for the Syrian economy. Moving from being self-
sufficient to a net oil importer is a huge problem Syria faces today. 
Concerns over oil security are increasingly influencing Damascus’s 
diplomatic and strategic calculations. 
 In addition, during his 30-year tenure, which lasted from 1970 
to 2000, the late President Hafez al-Asad was widely acknowledged to 
pursue a skilful foreign policy that placed Syria at the centre of regional 
affairs, with a role that exceeded its military and economic weight. This 
role has at one stage become Syria's major commodity. It was often seen 
as key to stability or instability in the region. The dividends generated 
from adopting certain foreign policies had however made Syria less 
inclined to pursue far-reaching reforms at home.  
 After the September 11 attacks on the US, the Bush 
administration pursued a policy resistant to a quid pro quo style in 
dealing with Syria. It has also discouraged foreign investment in Syria 
by adopting the Syria Accountability Act. In order to win Syria as a 
strategic ally, Iran tried to play the role of a patron. Yet, given Iran's 
problematic relations with the rest of the world and its own economic 
difficulties, it could not provide what Syria really needed. 
 Threat perceptions, mounting pressure and isolation by the US, 
and cold relations with most of the Arab world, had affected Syria's 
reform project, creating a less friendly environment to liberalise the 
economy and the political life. Yet, crises do sometimes produce 
positive side effects. Isolation, external pressure and the lack of foreign 
aid should act as a catalyst rather than a hindrance to reform. Damascus 
is no longer in a position to bury or ignore problems. 
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 And yet, if one insists that domestic reforms cannot be 
undertaken unless more favourable external conditions are in place, that 
assumption too is outdated, in view of the improvement in Syria’s 
regional and external environment. After seven years of reacting to 
foreign threats, Syria has weathered most of the fall-out resulting from 
the September 11 attacks on the US. It remains to be seen, however, 
how far Syria can go in pursuing its domestic reforms under the new 
conditions. 
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The Role of Bashar al-Asad in Syrian 
Foreign Policy  
David W. Lesch 
What does Bashar want? An anecdote from one of my meetings with 
Bashar al-Asad provides some insight into this. A Bush expletive aimed 
at Syria in a discussion with PM Blair during the G-8 summit meeting in 
the context of the Israeli-Hizbullah war of summer 2006 had been 
caught on tape. Bashar’s response essentially was that Syria wants to be 
taken seriously, wants to be respected, wants a seat at the diplomatic 
table, and will do what it can within a certain range of options to get 
there in ways that Syrian policy makers think are calibrated. As Bashar 
emphatically said in his interview with The Guardian appearing on 17 
February 2009: “We are a player in the region. If you want to talk about 
peace, you can’t advance without Syria.”  
 It is thus a pity that the US image of Bashar was so skewed and 
unrealistic at the beginning of his tenure in power, a factor in the 
dramatic souring of US-Syrian relations. Certainly he was 
underestimated, seen as politically inexperienced, a computer nerd and 
ophthalmologist who liked Phil Collins music. There was no way he 
could meet the high expectations in the West given the dilapidated, 
broken-down country he inherited and the regional and international 
baptism by fire he immediately encountered. Much of the congressional 
testimony regarding Bashar surrounding the Syrian Accountability Act 
in 2002-2003 was grossly ill-informed. Congress was in the post 9/11 
“more anti-terrorist than thou” mode so they hopped on the anti-Syria 
bandwagon, which was an easy thing to do at the time. Bashar has been 
fighting that negative image ever since. The Syrians are typically bad at 
public diplomacy in the West, although Bashar is better than his father. 
Unfortunately, Bashar did not adequately adjust to the shifts in US 
foreign policy under Bush. At times, he did not help matters with his 
sometimes less-than-prudent comments made for domestic and regional 
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consumption which fed into the construction and confirmation of the 
negative image of Bashar and policy against Syria that was going on in 
Washington at the same time. This period led to a perceptual gap that 
still exists and must be overcome, a kind of anti-Syrian perceptual 
inertia that exists in Washington. A similar deep-seated distrust of 
Washington has congealed in Damascus. 
 Although Bashar has a progressive and modernizing orientation 
on some, notably domestic issues, we must remember that he is Hafiz al-
Asad’s son in more ways than one. He spent a mere 18 months in 
London studying ophthalmology. He is a child of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict; he is innately designed to protect traditional Syrian foreign 
policy interests. 
 I have personally seen him grow into his position over the years 
from being a bit unsure of himself and the world to being rather cocky at 
times; indeed, I saw him during the 2007 election/referendum, and he 
was almost cathartically exuberant over the outpouring of support for 
him, no matter how much it was orchestrated rather than genuine. That 
was the first time I got the feeling that he was making that shift from a 
possibly transitional authoritarian figure toward a lifetime appointment 
in power. Of course, this transition is no surprise as he has been on the 
upswing since the low point of the Mehlis report in late 2005. This is 
due in part to his own maneuvering, not to be underestimated, and his 
riding the concurrent upswings over the last few years of Iran, 
Hizbullah, and Hamas as well as benefiting from US problems in the 
region. In a way, he chose the winning side, or at least the more popular 
side, and he feels somewhat vindicated. He has successfully broken out 
of the US imposed isolation, with the US itself seemingly left to decide 
how much it wants to seriously engage with Damascus. 
 Let there be no doubt that Bashar is securely in power (and I 
was saying this during the heyday of the Mehlis report in late 2005, 
when the US and the exiled Syrian opposition seriously overplayed their 
hands). He built up an aquifer of support in Syria and in the region from 
keeping the country together despite external pressures and instability in 
neighboring countries, and from being perceived as not having caved 
into the American project in the region, particularly in Lebanon. He 
effectively funneled the expected nationalist response to this pressure 
and the need for resistance into support for the regime that has 
empowered the regime to quell domestic dissent and promoted 
Bonapartist tendencies in the presidency. 
 Bashar does not, however, have absolute authority. It would be 
wrong to see the Syrian regime, or the Syrian security apparatus, as a 
tightly knit, well-oiled, hierarchical machine. On a number of domestic 
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issues of varying levels of importance, the right hand of the government 
does not know what the left hand of the mukhabarat is doing, and vice 
versa. Even though it is a neo-patrimonial regime (i.e. a system of rule 
based on administrative and military personnel who are responsible only 
to the ruler and on the allocation of resources establishing pervasive 
clientelist networks), Bashar has to reach consensus, negotiate, bargain, 
and manipulate the system. Implementation of domestic policy issues is 
a serious problem in Syria. Bashar is fighting against systemic, 
institutional, bureaucratic and cultural inertia. Also he inherited an array 
of Faustian bargains made under his father, i.e. unswerving loyalty to 
the leader in return for his casting a blind eye toward personal 
enrichment and corruption, that sometimes has the regime sincerely 
saying and wanting to do one thing, while actions by important groups 
connected to the regime, or actually in the regime, do something quite 
different. There is nothing that Bashar can do at times without 
undercutting his support base, something especially risky in a 
threatening regional environment.  
 Bashar has, however, acquired control over foreign policy 
decisions, which was not always the case, with the major turning point 
being the 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon and the exiling of Khaddam; 
in a sense, he lost Beirut and the network of interests stretching from 
there to Damascus, but in cutting these links gained full control in 
Damascus. The decision-making process remains a rather ad-hoc 
response to challenges and threats, without long term strategic thinking 
and reliant therefore on traditional modus operandi. There is no national 
security council-like mechanism coordinating policy; instead, there 
seem to be informal committees that focus on various foreign policy 
issues. Despite this ad-hocism, Syrian officials have a way of getting in 
line with regime policy, mimicking declarations and pronouncements 
often word by word. On some issues, it seems that Bashar tries to 
balance Walid al-Mouallem and Farouk al-Shara’, as with the IAEA 
investigation in which Walid won on allowing them into the country 
while Farouk won in not allowing any media coverage while they were 
there. While many in the West see Syria’s ties with Hizbullah, Hamas, 
and Iran as a liability and obstacle to rehabilitating Syria’s international 
position, Bashar actually sees them as potential assets. In this respect 
Bashar insisted to me that Syria’s support for Hizbullah and Hamas have 
nothing to do with Iran, with whom Syria has ideological differences, 
and are rather cards in the peace negotiations with Israel. With Syria it is 
all about leverage and bargaining chips, and it is a relatively weak 
country with few arrows in its quiver, so it is not about to give them up, 
certainly not before any peace negotiations begin. On the other hand, if 
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Syria is given a real seat at the table, which finally seems to be 
happening under the stewardship of the Obama administration, Bashar 
sees his country as a conduit in a positive-influence process, a facilitator 
in resolving regional conflicts or moderating regional instabilities.   
 This is certainly how Bashar has tried to position Syria, or at 
least how he wants it to be perceived, that is, as a facilitating element, 
and a problem solver, not a problem seeker. Syria sees its ability to 
create problems, which it had every incentive to do when threatened, as 
translating into providing it with the ability to solve problems when its 
interests are respected. And Syria is uniquely placed to play this role, as 
it is the only major Arab country to be able to play both sides of the 
fence. On the one side, it has been the cradle of Arab nationalism and at 
the forefront of opposition to Israel and to the US invasion of Iraq which 
gives it credibility with radical forces in the region. Indeed, if Syria is to 
keep the role of a facilitator, this requires it to have good ties with both 
pro- and anti-Western forces; otherwise, it becomes less useful in the 
regional and international arena. So, one should not expect Syria to cut 
ties with any of the resistance groups in the near future. Indeed, insofar 
as Syria moves closer to the West, it risks losing its influence with these 
forces and with Iran, requiring a delicate balancing act.  
 Yet on the other hand, Syria has often tilted toward the West or 
the moderate forces and it can make a credible claim to be able to serve 
presumed Western interests in regional stability if its interests are 
respected. In 1991, it sent troops to fight alongside US troops in the Gulf 
war and thereafter engaged seriously in direct talks with Israel during 
the US-sponsored Madrid peace process in the 1990s. There was 
intelligence cooperation with the US on Islamic jihadist groups, in 2001-
2003 after 9/11, when Islamic extremism was seen as the biggest threat 
to both countries; only when the US became the greater threat to 
Damascus did this end and Syria moved closer to Iran. Syria can 
enhance Iraqi stability and security. There could be low-level 
cooperation over Iraqi refugees in Syria: Bashar told me he would like 
US help in funding the building of schools for Iraqi refugee children to 
keep them from going in a counterproductive direction. Turkish 
mediated exploration of the terms of peace negotiations with Israel were 
started, possibly within the framework of an international peace 
conference a la Madrid in 1991, this time based at least in part on the 
2002 Saudi-Arab League peace initiative. Syria could contribute to a 
regional security plan à la the Damascus Declaration after the first Gulf 
war, which would first require improvement in what has been an 
antagonistic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Syria over the last 
few years. 
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 Despite what Syria sees as attacks against it--from the 
Mughniyeh assassination in February 2008, to the Israeli strike against 
the suspected nuclear site in September 2007, and to the US cross-
border raid in October 2008--Bashar has not allowed such incidents to 
spiral out of control or rupture any chance for improving his relationship 
with Europe and the US, especially as it became clear that Obama would 
win the election and offer new opportunities for a dialogue. This reflects 
in one sense how weak Syria is at the level of direct military 
confrontation. But it also reflects a far-sighted strategic vision, a product 
of what Bashar has learned over the years which, for the time being, is 
shaping Syrian foreign policy.  
 On the other hand, he certainly feels somewhat empowered 
politically and in no hurry to move quickly, although Syria’s poor 
economic situation may dictate that Bashar cannot wait too long. He 
waited for Chirac to leave and it worked out; he waited for Bush to 
leave, and it worked out; hence he feels he can take a wait and see 
approach to assess the Obama administration’s priorities. He will also 
wait to see how the Israeli political situation plays itself out. He is not 
going to rush into anything with what he perceives to be a weak Israeli 
government; as he told me on one occasion, a strong Israeli government 
(of any type) can make peace or war; but a weak Israeli government can 
only make war. In October 2008 he told me that he did not want to 
elevate the indirect discussions with Israel to direct negotiations without 
assurance of success; he said that he was “new” to this game, that it was 
his “first time” at this, so he could not afford to fail.  
 What complicates these negotiations, as always, is the parallel 
Palestinian-Israel “track.” While Bashar would be very reluctant to sign 
a Syrian-Israeli accord ahead of a Palestinian-Israeli one, he did often 
mention to me that they do not have to be lock-step with each other. A 
Palestinian Authority official recently stated that the Syrian-Israeli track 
need not be harmful to progress on the Palestinian-Israeli track, and 
rather that the former could actually help the latter.  
 For Bashar, the Golan is the be all and end all result of being at 
the diplomatic table. He said to me in summer 2006 with great emotion 
that “I would be a hero” if he achieved the complete return of the Golan, 
intimating that this would provide him with the necessary legitimacy to 
advance regional peace and stability as well as domestic reform. In this 
sense, the systematic ingraining of the return of the Golan in the minds 
of two generations of Syrians, while being something of an obstacle to 
peace in the past, can actually work in favor of an agreement today. The 
Syrian regime believes it would empower it to assume responsibilities 
regionally and deliver reforms domestically as a result of peace.  
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 Potential obstacles to Syria assuming such a positive role are 
the web of UN resolutions, the UN Hariri tribunal, IAEA investigations, 
the US sanctions, and the State Department list of countries that sponsor 
terrorism. Although much of this was initiated under Bush as 
instruments of pressure on Syria, they have a life of their own now, 
especially the UN tribunal which could obstruct long-term normalization 
of Syria’s international position. They also mean that the Obama 
administration cannot move rapidly toward improved relations with 
Syria or into mediating a Syrian-Israeli peace. They coincide with 
powerful anti-Syrian elements in Washington in and outside of 
Congress, something of an anti-Syrian inertia, and a legacy of mistrust 
on both sides from the Bush years. But if there is the will in 
Washington, these issues could be separated from political engagement: 
even Saad Hariri mentioned that political engagement with Damascus 
could proceed along with the Tribunal—at least for a time.  
  It must be noted, however, that Syrian officials had a very 
negative view of Bill Clinton’s Middle East negotiating team, a reality 
which has been overshadowed by their even more negative view of the 
Bush administration; if much of the Obama negotiating team is simply a 
reconstitution of the Clinton team, the Syrians will remember their past 
experience and go slowly until they see tangible US commitment. 
 The Obama administration seems to have recognized the 
importance of improved relations with Syria. It announced in June 2009 
the return of the US ambassador to Damascus, a post left vacant since 
the Hariri assassination in 2005. The US apparently learned from the 
French example of measured quid pro quos with Syria, especially related 
to Lebanon. The re-establishment of a US-Syrian dialogue has provided 
a more favorable diplomatic environment for cooperation at many 
levels, including re-starting Israeli-Syrian negotiations, although the 
right-wing composition of the current Israeli government may work 
against this. In spite of this improved climate, the Syrians continue to 
get different signals from different parts of the administration, a fact of 
life that confused them a great deal during the George W. Bush years. 
 The US and Syria need to re-establish trust through dialogue, 
measure each other’s intentions, and take small steps that could lead to 
bigger ones. Without investing much political capital the Obama 
administration could improve relations by simply letting nature take its 
course by refraining from obstructing in the way Bush did Syria’s 
reintegration into the regional and international communities. But if it 
has the ambition to seriously give some new momentum to the stalled 
Arab-Israeli peace process, one necessary strategic move would be to 
develop a cautious partnership with Syria. 
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Inching out of Isolation: Managing a 
Different Relationship with Syria1 
Bassma Kodmani 
For Syria, half a decade of difficulties appears to be over. On the 
economic front, the financial situation has hardly been affected by 
regional difficulties. This does not mean that the economy has improved 
but the flow of money has allowed the president to show some 
“largesse” by increasing wages of government employees and reducing 
taxes on corporations. The current financial crisis is only starting to hit. 
Its first impact is visible on the reduction in remittances transferred by 
Syrian workers in the Gulf countries. 
 On the political front, the opposition has almost entirely lost the 
narrow space that had existed in previous years. The departure of Syrian 
troops from Lebanon coincided (and this is not entirely a coincidence) 
with the silencing of opponents in a moment of vulnerability for the 
regime, when it was under strong attacks from Arab and Western 
countries. Unlike in many other Arab countries, political prisoners in 
Syria are not of the radical type, defiant of political order. They are 
moderate, reasonable democrats who were calling for peaceful change. 
The profiles of the political prisoners reflect the fierce nature of the 
regime, and its lack of tolerance of any form of protest, even when 
activists seek to engage in a dialogue with the government. The 
opposition is ostracized and choked. It is in disarray and divided on 
strategies for survival. But the major disagreements among opposition 
groups emerge around Arab issues rather than domestic issues: on 
attitudes towards Hamas and in face of the Gaza disaster. While some 
thought the opposition should continue its struggle for domestic reforms, 
others called for halting expressions of protest in order to show a unified 
“patriotic” position of support for the Palestinians under attack in Gaza. 
 The pattern of opposition in future is shaping up: there will be 
little underground activity as there is no support for it within the 
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population which is most concerned about stability. The Muslim 
Brothers lost too much in the eighties and now see underground 
opposition as a failed strategy. Given that there is no space for 
opposition inside, the opposition is organizing outside the country, 
mainly in Lebanon and in Europe (for example, a new TV station was 
announced by the coalition of the Damascus Declaration). In brief, the 
opposition has little support inside, at least for now. It might become 
more significant if the domestic situation worsens, and if outside support 
becomes acceptable to public opinion. But the Syrian public has an 
acute sense of vulnerability and the belief that the country is the object 
of conspiracies is widespread. Even if large sections of the population 
have no respect for the rulers, they cannot contemplate the idea that 
outside players might have a positive role: “Our rulers may be thugs but 
they are our thugs” is the common thinking. However, the government 
in Damascus was confronted with the Sunni Jihad challenge, which is 
partly a fall-out of the war in Iraq, and partly of Sunni-Shia tensions in 
Lebanon. 
Syria’s Foreign Strategy in 2009 
Syria has always worked through its regional environment. It is probably 
the Arab state most embedded in its regional environment, a strategy 
that has enabled Syria to sustain isolation and, when time comes, to cash 
in on the assets accumulated. During the Cold War, Syria learnt not to 
make itself dependant on outside powers. 
 Lebanon: The recovery of Syria after the big blunder of 
Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops is remarkable. 2008 was a 
year of regaining some ground in the country: Hizbullah’s coup de force 
in Beirut in spring was followed by the Doha compromise agreement 
that gave Syria’s allies a clear advantage by securing veto power for 
them within the Lebanese government. Doha was widely perceived in 
Damascus as a success for Syria in that it brought satisfaction to its 
Lebanese allies. Doha was a renewed recognition by the Arab countries 
that Syria has legitimate interests in Lebanon. After the election of 
Michel Suleiman, one of the first statements of the new president was 
about Lebanon’s strategic doctrine and the need to coordinate with Syria 
in the process of redefining it. Thus, the new president was 
acknowledging that Lebanon is part of Syria’s strategic space.  
Syria chose not to intervene in any visible manner during the 
elections in Lebanon in June 2009 and emphasized instead that this was 
a strictly internal matter. But the difficulties that the designated Prime 
Minister Saad Hariri is encountering in forming a new government and 
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the numerous visits to Damascus by Lebanese politicians are a sign of 
Syria’s renewed (or uninterrupted) meddling in Lebanese affairs. It is as 
if Damascus chose to allow the election process to take place smoothly 
while remaining confident that it can later neutralize any gains that its 
Lebanese foes and their allies think they have achieved. 
 Palestine: Hamas and Hizbullah have given new strategic depth 
to the Palestinian question, a strategic depth that is no longer Arab but 
Islamic. While some might think that this is potentially uncomfortable 
for the rule of the minority in Syria, in fact it allowed Syria to recover its 
traditional position as the stronghold of steadfastness. The fact that this 
new resistance is both Sunni and Shia makes it even more comfortable 
as Syria can present itself as championing a sacred alliance for the just 
cause of Palestine. In this context, it is not easy to imagine that Syria 
will give up support to Hamas and Hizbullah. The cost in terms of 
Syria’s strategic posture would be too high. Syria cultivates its image as 
the only Arab country that has not capitulated and abandoned the 
Palestinians for peace with Israel. Its priority for some time to come 
remains to accumulate assets and Hizbullah and Hamas are its key 
strategic assets. 
 Iran: In the early period of Bashar, his lack of experience (and 
the Bush administration’s attitude towards Syria) led him to put Syria 
under the umbrella of Iran and, with this protection, he developed his 
understanding of regional and international politics. He made mistakes, 
paid the price, and learnt lessons: he learnt for instance why the 
moderate Arab camp matters and why he needs to balance his relations 
with Iran with links to them. Damascus was ready to make this move 
before the advent of the new administration in the United States. Iran 
was a looser of Gaza because the military option (Hamas’s rockets on 
Israel) proved to be a non-strategy. Hamas is now seeking national 
unity. It sees the opportunity of coming back into a political process 
from which it has been excluded since the summer coup of 2007. While 
Syria favors a national unity government in Palestine, Iran is already 
expressing some unease and saying that “the Palestinian issue is not only 
Arab,” i.e. it is also Islamic. 
 Israel: Will Netanyahu offer something interesting to Syria? 
Will the United States be tempted to support a separate Israeli-Syrian 
track and neglect the Palestinian issue? Due to Syria’s strategy of 
embeddedness, the Golan issue will be difficult to separate from the 
Palestinian issue. Therefore, a peace strategy vis-à-vis Syria is more 
likely to be effective if it takes a regional approach. Alternatively, Syria 
might well decide to pursue negotiations with Israel in view of defining 
the full terms of a settlement on the Golan but would probably “shelve” 
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the agreement and avoid the obligations that will result from signing it, 
until serious progress is made on the Palestinian issue. 
Conclusion 
Syria has managed to contain the multitude of threats issuing from its 
environment and Bashar has learned to fine tune his balancing acts in 
the region. On the other hand, there has been no major positive 
transformation in Syria’s position, hence no major change in its strategy. 
It is unlikely to abandon its alliances with Hizbullah, Hamas or Iran 
without a settlement with Israel, while a Syrian settlement with Israel 
probably depends, in turn, on parallel progress on other tracks, notably 
in Palestine, but probably also in Lebanon and in US-Iran relations. The 
conflicts of the region are a seamless web, the strands of which it is 
almost impossible to unpick and separate.  
                                         
1 This is based on a presentation delivered at the annual Paris joint meeting 
of the Centre for Naval Analysis and the Forum du Futur 05/03/09. 
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